Merrick Young Incorporated v. Wal-mart Real Estate Resources Trusts, Engineered Structures Inc., and the American Insurance Company : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
Merrick Young Incorporated v. Wal-mart Real
Estate Resources Trusts, Engineered Structures Inc.,
and the American Insurance Company : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. Scott Savage; Stephen R. Waldron; Savage, Yeates, & Waldron; Jon Lear; Lear & Learn.
Clark B. Fetzer; Finehart, Fetzer, Simonsen & Booth; Kim Trout; Vicky J. Elkin; Trout, Jones,
Gledhill, Fuhrman.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Merrick Young Inc v. Engineered Structures Inc, No. 20090227 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1567
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE RESOURCES 
TRUSTS, ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, 
INC., AND THE AMERICAN INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Appellate Case No. 20090227-CA 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS FOR RELIEF OF AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND RELATED RULINGS FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, 
WASHINGTON COUNTY,THE HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM PRESIDING 
Clark B . Fetzer (1069) 
RINEHART FETZER SIMONSEN & 
BOOTH 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-0266 
clark@mountainwestlaw.com 
Kim Trout (ISB 2468) 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P. A. 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)331-1170 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Stephen R. Waldron (6810) 
Kyle C.Thompson (11242) 
SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 




Attorneys for Appellant 
Merrick Young Incorporated 
FH.ED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
DEC 0 7 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE RESOURCES 
TRUSTS, ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, 
INC., AND THE AMERICAN INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Appellate Case No. 20090227-CA 
Defendants/Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS FOR RELIEF OF AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND RELATED RULINGS FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, 
WASHINGTON COUNTY,THE HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM PRESIDING 
Clark B.Fetzer (1069) 
RINEHART FETZER SIMONSEN & 
BOOTH 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-0266 
cl ark(2),mountain westl aw. com 
Kim Trout (ISB 2468) 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. 
225 North 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)331-1170 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Stephen R. Waldron (6810) 
Kyle C.Thompson (11242) 
SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON, P.C. 
170 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 




Attorneys for Appellant 
Merrick Young Incorporated 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
I. Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition 
In The Court Below 3 
II. Statement Of Facts Relevant To The Appeal 9 
A. Defendants Below Were Not Parties to the March 
2004 Settlement Agreement or to the Separate Action 
Resolved by that Agreement 9 
B. The March 2004 Settlement Agreement Did Not Provide 
that All of MYFs Assets Were Transferred to Developers 
and Mr. Seely 11 
C. Mr. Seely and MYI Never Intended, Under the March 
2004 Settlement Agreement, that the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" Included the Subject Claims, and Offered 
Extrinsic Evidence that there Was No Such Intent 16 
D. The Trial Court Dismissed the Subject Claims Upon 
Its Interpretation of the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement as Unambiguously Providing for the 
Transfer of the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely, and Did Not 
Consider Either the Reasonableness of Mr. Seely's and 
MYFs Claimed Interpretation or Their Extrinsic Evidence 18 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 24 
ARGUMENT 27 
I. Under A Settled Utah Rule Of Contract Interpretation, The 
Trial Court Erred In Interpreting The Term "Indemnitors' 
Assets" As Unambiguously Providing For The Transfer Of The 
Subject Claims Without Considering Mr. Seely's And MYFs 
Extrinsic Evidence As To A Contrary Intent, Because 
The Language Defining That Tenn Was Reasonably Susceptible 
To Being Interpreted To Not Include The Subject Claims 28 
II. MYI Was Prejudiced By The Trial Court's Error In Interpreting 
The Term "Indemnitors' Assets" Without Considering Mr. Seely's 
And MYI's Extrinsic Evidence Regarding Their Intent As To The 
Meaning Of That Tenn 41 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 43 
ADDENDUM 44 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Mifflin v. Shiki, 293 P. 1, 3 (Utah 1930) 35 
Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, ffl[ 25, 
207 P.3d 1235 33 
Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, If 26-31,190 P.3d 1269 25, 28-31, 38-40 
Encon Utah, LLC v. Flour Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7,210 P.3d 263 36 
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996) 33 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers, Ass 'n., 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995) 25, 28-31, 38, 39 
WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, 54 P.3d 1139 
U 15, 54 P.3d 1134 3,28 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G) 1 
RULES 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 1 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 1 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(b) 45 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) 40 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 1 
-iv-
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Appellant Merrick Young Incorporated, plaintiff/counter-defendant below ("MYI"), 
appeals the dismissal with prejudice of its claims for relief asserted in the Amended 
Complaint below. The final order of dismissal, which was entitled "Amended Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice" and certified by the trial court as a final order for appeal pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) ("Order of Dismissal"), was entered below on April 20, 2009 and 
MYI filed its Notice of Appeal on April 21, 2009. (R. 4198-200 (Tab D), 4204-05.)1 The 
Utah Supreme Court transferred the appeal to this Court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 42(a) 
by order dated March 20, 2009. (R. 4194.) This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), Utah R. App. P. 3 and 4, and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3Xj)9(4X§78A-4-103(2)0).2 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The issue on appeal concerns who owns the claims for relief asserted in the Amended 
Complaint that were dismissed with prejudice by the subject Order of Dismissal, as between 
1
 Record items cited as "Tab" are included in the Addendum at the referenced Tab. 
2
 This appeal is a consolidated matter, by Orders of this Court dated May 29, 2009 
and October 26,2009, involving Case No. 20090227-CA, Case No. 20090351-CA and Case 
No. 20090297-CA. Case No. 20090227-CA was initiated by MYFs February 23, 2009 
Notice of Appeal from the original January 21,2009 Order of Dismissal. (R. 4174-76.) MYI 
filed a notice of appeal as to the original Order of Dismissal prior to its certification as a final 
order pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) out of an abundance of caution so as to avoid losing 
its right to appeal the dismissal of the subject claims for relief. Case No. 20090351-CA was 
initiated by MYFs April 21, 2009 Notice of Appeal from the final April 20, 2009 Order of 
Dismissal. (R. 4204-06.) Case No. 20090297 involves defendant's appeal of the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion for sanctions under Utah R. Civ. P. 11, which concerns the 
same issue as to who owns the subject claims for relief as is presented by MYFs appeal. 
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MYI and Clyde G. Seely, involuntary plaintiff/counter-defendant below, both of whom claim 
MYI owns the subject claims for relief. This issue turns on interpretation of a March 2004 
settlement agreement between MYI, Mr. Seely and MYFs bonding company, which had 
resolved a separate action against MYI by that bonding company. Engineered Structures, 
Inc. ("ESI"), defendant/counterclaimaint below and a stranger to the settlement agreement, 
claimed below that MYI had transferred the subject claims for relief to Mr. Seely pendente 
lite under that settlement agreement. Mr. Seely and MYI disputed that claim. After having 
obtained Mr. Seely's joinder below as an involuntary plaintiff based upon that claim, ESI 
eventually got Mr. Seely to stipulate to the dismissal of the subject claims for relief with 
prejudice in exchange for dismissal of ESP s claims for relief against Mr. Seely for somehow 
wrongfully allowing MYI to continue as the plaintiff below. ESI then obtained the subject 
Order of Dismissal based upon that stipulation. The trial court entered the Order of 
Dismissal upon ESFs motion for dismissal, over MYFs objection, ruling that Mr. Seely 
owned the claims under the settlement agreement and thus could stipulate to their dismissal, 
without considering Mr. Seely's and MYF s evidence that there had been no intent to transfer 
the subject claims for relief. This appeal raises the following issue: 
Did the trial court err in interpreting the March 2004 settlement agreement as, on its 
face, unambiguously providing for the transfer of the subject claims for relief, without 
considering the extrinsic evidence presented and offered by the parties to that agreement 
regarding their intent as to the contested contract term, when (1) the agreement's contested 
definition of the assets that had been transferred to Mr. Seely is reasonably susceptible to the 
- ? -
interpretation that the subject claims for relief were not included in the transferred assets, if 
not reasonably susceptible only to this interpretation, and (2) the extrinsic evidence showed 
there had been no intent to include those claims in the transferred assets and there was no 
contrary evidence? (R. 4122-31 (Tab H).) 
The trial court's interpretation of the March 2004 settlement agreement is given no 
deference on appeal and is reviewed for correctness. WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity 
Serv. Corp.. 2002 UT 88. ^  15. 54 P.3d 1139. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition In The Court 
Below 
This case is for recovery of amounts due under a construction subcontract between 
MYI5 the subcontractor, and ESI, the general contractor, regarding a project owned by Wal-
Mart Real Estate Business Trust, also a defendant below ("Wal-Mart"). (R. 13-26.) The 
project was a Wal-Mart super store development in Washington County, Utah. (R. 15) MYI 
asserted claims for relief for breach of contract, lien foreclosure and recovery of a payment 
bond against ESI, Wal-Mart and The American Insurance Company, ESFs payment bond 
surety ("American Insurance"), alleging MYI had not been paid approximately $1.3 million 
for materials and work performed in connection with the construction of retaining walls as 
part of the project.3 (R. 13-26.) MYI filed the original Complaint on May 4, 2001, and an 
Amended Complaint on June 7, 2001. (R. 1, 13.) 
3
 The case also originally included claims by and against one of MYTs sub-
subcontractors, Western Rocks Products, Inc. (R. 13-26.) All claims against and by Western 
Rocks Products, Inc. were dismissed from the case in July 2006. (R 1073-75.) 
Because this appeal concerns the ownership and dismissal of the claims for relief 
asserted in MYFs Amended Complaint, those claims are referred to here as the "Subject 
Claims." 
On August 1,2001, ESI and American Insurance answered the Amended Complaint 
and ESI counterclaimed against MYI with claims for breach of the their construction 
subcontract.4 (R. 37-57.) On June 27, 2005, ESI filed an Amended Counterclaim against 
MYI, which carried forward the breach of contract claim and added a claim for specific 
performance as to MYFs alleged indemnification duties under the subject subcontract 
(relating to MYFs subcontractor's claim against ESI). (R. 465-71.) 
In January 2007, ESI started focusing its defense of the Subject Claims on a March 
2004 "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" (the "March 2004 
Settlement Agreement"). The March 2004 Settlement Agreement was between MYI, 
Merrick and Stephanie Young (husband and wife and MYF s principals/owners), Developers 
Surety and Indemnity Company ("Developers") and Mr. Seely, and had resolved a separate 
action against MYI by Developers, which was MYFs bonding company. (R. 1672-1680 
(Tab A), 1636-64.) As discussed more fully in the Statement of Facts section below, the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement provided that eight categories of specifically listed assets 
of MYI and the Youngs were transferred to Mr. Seely, who paid $150,000 to Developers. 
(R. 1672-80 (Tab A).) ESI, a stranger to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, claimed 
4
 ESI also originally asserted claims for relief by way of cross-claim and third-party 
complaint against Wal-Mart and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (R. 48-56.) Those claims were 
resolved and dismissed on September 23, 2002, and Wal-Mart joined with ESI, retaining 
ESFs counsel, to defend against MYFs claims for relief. (R. 246-48, 242-44.) 
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below that the Subject Claims were included in the assets that were transferred to Mr. Seely 
under that agreement. (R. 1259-71, 1469-71, 1472-83, 3025-27.) MYI, the alleged 
transferor, and Mr. Seely, the alleged transferee, disputed that claim below. (R. 1310-17, 
3186, 3192, 3195-98, 3203-17h, 3286-98 (Tab F), 4122-31 (Tab H).) 
ESI first used the March 2004 Settlement Agreement to have Mr. Seely involuntarily 
joined as a plaintiff in the action below, based upon the claim that Mr. Seely was the owner 
of the Subject Claims under that agreement. 
On January 22, 2007, ESI filed a Rule 17(a) Objection, claiming Mr. Seely was the 
real plaintiff-in-interest as to the Subject Claims, and on February 20, 2007, ESI moved 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c) to have Mr. Seely joined or substituted as plaintiff, based upon 
ESTs claim that Mr. Seely was the owner of the Subject Claims under the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement. (R. 1256-58,1259-71,1469-71,1472-83.) MYI opposed EST s Rule 
17(a) Objection on the grounds, inter alia, that MYI continued to own the Subject Claims 
and opposed ESI's Rule 25(c) motion on the grounds, inter alia, it was not necessary under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c) to join Mr. Seely even if he were the owner of the Subject Claims. (R. 
1310-17,1517-27.) On May 21,2007, without interpretation of the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, the trial court ordered Mr. Seely's joinder as an involuntary plaintiff, in addition 
to MYI, upon ESPs February 20, 2007 motion. (R. 2903, 2905-07.) 
After using the March 2004 Settlement Agreement to have Mr. Seely joined as an 
involuntary plaintiff, ESI next used that agreement to assert claims for relief against Mr. 
Seely, based upon the allegation that he owned the Subject Claims under that agreement. 
-S-
On August 16,2007, ESI filed a Second Amended Counterclaim. (R. 3014-179.) The 
Second Amended Counterclaim carried forward the claims for relief against only MYI for 
breach of contract and specific performance, based upon the same subcontract that was the 
subject of the Amended Complaint, and asserted new claims for declaratory judgment 
regarding ownership of the Subject Claims and new claims against Mr. Seely alone for abuse 
of process and recovery of attorneys' fees. (R. 3020-30.) The new claims for relief were 
based upon ESFs allegation that Mr. Seely had become the owner of the Subject Claims 
under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 3022-30.) ESI alleged that Mr. Seely had 
acted wrongfully by allegedly allowing MYI to continue to prosecute the Subject Claims 
after March 2004. (R. 3027-30.) MYI replied to the Second Amended Counterclaim, 
denying ESFs allegations that MYI had transferred the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely. (R. 
3186,3192,3195-98.) 
On September 28, 2007, Mr. Seely, an Idaho resident, moved to dismiss the claims 
of the Second Amended Counterclaim against him on the grounds, inter alia, of lack of 
personal jurisdiction. (R. 3217-18, 3203-17bbb.) As discussed in the Statement of Facts 
section below, Mr. Seely supported his motion to dismiss with his declaration stating he 
did not own the Subject Claims. (R. 3217-17b (Tab E).)5 
On April 10, 2008, the trial court entered a Ruling on Clyde G. Seely's Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim (the "April 10,2008 Ruling on Seely's Motion to 
5
 MYI includes in its Addendum items from the record on appeal that were incorrectly 
numbered by the clerk's office, including Mr. Seely's declaration and its attachment. MYI 
includes these items in their original form from the record on appeal. 
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Dismiss"), denying Mr. Seely's September 28,2007 motion to dismiss the Second Amended 
Counterclaim. (R. 3280-84 (Tab B).) As discussed in the Statement of Facts section below, 
in the April 10, 2008 Ruling on Seely's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court ruled that it had 
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Seely on the basis that Mr. Seely had the right to control the 
Subject Claims under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 3282-83 (Tab B).) 
On April 28, 2008, Mr. Seely replied to the Second Amended Counterclaim. (R. 
3286-99 (Tab F).) In his reply, which is discussed more fully in the Statement of Facts 
section below, Mr. Seely continued to deny that he was the owner of the Subject Claims. (R. 
3292-93, 3297 (Tab F).) 
After having used the March 2004 Settlement Agreement to successfully assert claims 
for relief against Mr. Seely, ESI finally used those claims for relief as leverage to obtain Mr. 
Seely's stipulation to the dismissal of the Subject Claims and, based upon that stipulation, 
obtained the Order of Dismissal as if Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims. 
In October 2008, defendants ESI, American Insurance and Wal-Mart, and involuntary 
plaintiff Mr. Seely entered into a settlement agreement in which Mr. Seely stipulated to the 
dismissal of the Subject Claims. (R. 4111-14 (Tab G).) As discussed in the Statement of 
Facts section below, in the October 2008 settlement agreement, Mr. Seely expressly 
reserved his position that he was not the owner of the Subject Claims. (R. 4111-12 (Tab 
G).) 
Mr. Seely's only consideration for his stipulation to the dismissal of the Subject 
Claims was a release from and dismissal of EST s claims for relief of the Second Amended 
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Counterclaim against Mr. Seely (which were based upon ESFs contention that Mr. Seely, 
rather than MYI, owned the Subject Claims). (R. 4111-14 (Tab G).) MYI was not a party 
to the October 2008 settlement agreement or its negotiation, was not aware of that agreement 
before it was presented to the trial court in November 2008, and received no consideration 
under that agreement or otherwise for the dismissal of the Subject Claims that it alone had 
carried the burden of prosecuting since the inception of the case. (R. 4111-14 (Tab G).) 
On November 24,2008, ESI, along with American Insurance and Wal-Mart, moved 
for entry of the original Order of Dismissal based upon Mr. Seely's stipulation to that order, 
which provided for dismissal with prejudice of the Subject Claims, as well as ESFs claims 
for relief on the Second Amended Counterclaim against Mr. Seely. (R. 4107-16 (Tab G), 
4117-21,4157-59.) As discussed more fully in the Statement of Facts section below, MYI 
opposed defendants' November 24,2008 Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice as to the Subject 
Claims on the grounds, inter alia, that Mr. Seely lacked standing to stipulate to the dismissal 
of the Subject Claims. (R. 4122-31 (Tab H).) 
On January 21,2009, without a hearing, the trial court entered a Ruling on Motion for 
Dismissal granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (the "January 21, 2009 
Ruling of Dismissal"), and entered the requested original Order of Dismissal. (R. 4152-56 
(Tab C), 4157-59.) In the January 21, 2009 Ruling of Dismissal, the trial court ruled that it 
already had decided that Mr. Seely was the owner of the Subject Claims in its April 10,2008 
Ruling on Seely's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 4152 (Tab C).) As discussed in the Statement of 
Facts section below, in the January 21, 2009 Ruling of Dismissal, the trial court reiterated 
-R-
and expanded upon its interpretation of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement as 
unambiguously providing for the transfer from MYI to Developers and then to Mr. Seely of 
the Subject Claims. (R. 4152-54 (Tab C).) As such, the trial court ruled, "Mr. Seely now has 
the right to pursue the claims filed by MYI in this case or to settle them." (R. 4154 (Tab C 
at p. 3).) 
On April 20, 2009, the trial court entered the final Order of Dismissal from which 
MYI appeals, upon MYFs February 6,2009 Rule 54(b) Motion to Amend Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice as a Final Order for Appeal. (R. 4162-69,4170-73,4198-200 (Tab D).) The 
final Order of Dismissal dismissed with prejudice the Subject Claims and was certified by 
the trial court as a final judgment for appeal. (R. 4200 (Tab D).) 
IL Statement Of Facts Relevant To The Appeal 
A. Defendants Below Were Not Parties to the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement or to the Separate Action Resolved by that Agreement 
The parties to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement were MYI, Merrick and 
Stephanie Young, Developers and Mr. Seely. (R. 1672-80 (Tab A).) MYI and the Youngs 
were referred to as the "Indemnitors" in the agreement. (R. 1672 (Tab A at Recital D).) Mr. 
Seely is Stephanie Young's father, and was identified in the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement as "an individual interested in purchasing certain assets of MYI. . . . Seely's 
interest is in purchasing assets of Indemnitors owned by Developers or which are subject to 
the judgment, injunction, and garnishment." (R. 1676 (Tab A at Recital H (emphasis 
added)).) Mr. Seely later declared that he had entered into the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement in order to pay off certain of his daughter's and son-in-law's debts so as to help 
-Q-
them avoid bankruptcy. (R. 3217a (Tab E at ^ 4).) 
The March 2004 Settlement Agreement resolved an action, separate from the action 
below, against MYI by Developers, Case No. 02-0502319 in the Fifth Judicial District Court 
("Developers' Separate Action"). (R. 1672-80 (Tab A), 1636-64.) Developers had issued 
performance bonds in favor of MYI in connection with two construction projects unrelated 
to the Wal-Mart project that was the subject of the underlying action, the "Black Ridge 
Project" and the "River Road Project." (R. 1672 (Tab A at Recitals A-C), 1636-70.) In 
connection with the bonds, MYI and the Youngs had agreed to indemnify Developers if 
Developers had to pay on the bonds and had pledged certain assets to Developers in order 
to secure their indemnity obligation. (R. 1672-73 (Tab A at Recital D), 1637-38.) 
Developers had paid on the two bonds and, as a result, sued MYI and the Youngs in 
Developer's Separate Action to enforce their indemnity obligation and pledge. (R. 1673-76 
(Tab A at Recitals E, F, I), 1637-38.) In Developers' Separate Action, Developers obtained 
an order allowing it to execute upon MYI's and the Youngs' assets, including eight 
categories of specifically listed assets. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F), 1626-34 (Tab I at 
pp. 7-8).) Prior to executing on MYPs or the Youngs' assets, Developers, MYI, the Youngs 
and Mr. Seely entered into the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, which resolved 
Developers' Separate Action. (R. 1672-80 (Tab A).) As discussed below, the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement provided for the transfer of certain of MYI's and the Youngs' assets 
to Developers and Mr. Seely. 
None of the defendants below, ESI, Wal-Mart, or American Insurance, were parties 
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to Developers' Separate Action or to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 1672-80 
(Tab A), 1636-64.) 
B. The March 2004 Settlement Agreement Did Not Provide that All of MYFs 
Assets Were Transferred to Developers and Mr. Seely 
The March 2004 Settlement Agreement used the defined term "Indemnitors' Assets" 
to identify the assets that were transferred from MYI (and the Youngs) to Mr. Seely under 
that agreement. Paragraph 2 of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement provided in relevant 
part that: 
(1) MYI and the Youngs confirmed that they had transferred to Developers any 
and all of their interests in the "Indemnitors5 Assets": 
Indemnitors confirm and aver that Indemnitors have assigned, transferred, and 
set over to Developers any and all interests, rights, and title that Indemnitors 
possess or may possess to Indemnitors' Assets. 
(R. 1676 (Tab A at K 2(b) (emphasis added)).) 
(2) Mr. Seely paid to Developers $ 150,000: 
Concurrently with Developers' execution of this Agreement, Seely shall pay 
Developers a lump sum payment of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($150,000.00) in certified funds. 
(R. 1676 (Tab A at Tf 2(c)).) 
(3) In consideration of Mr. Seely's payment of $150,000, Developers transferred 
to Mr. Seely the "Indemnitors' Assets," with the exception of the Black Ridge Project and 
its related claims: 
In consideration of Seely's payment to Developers of One Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) in certified funds, Developers (I) hereby 
assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely any and all interests rights, and title 
-11-
that Developers possesses or may possess to the payment of any money 
regarding the UDOT Project, including any and all interests, rights and title to 
the UDOT Litigation; and (ii) hereby assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely 
all Indemnitors' Assets with the exception of the Black Ridge Drive Project, 
the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation, and Developers Black Ridge 
Drive Project Litigation. 
(R. 1676-77 (Tab A at f^ 2(d) (emphasis added)).) Under these provisions of paragraph 2 of 
the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, the assets of MYI and the Youngs that were 
transferred to Mr. Seely were only the "Indemnitors' Assets" (with the exception of the 
Black Ridge Project and its related claims, which were left with Developers). 
The term "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined in Recital F of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement, by reference to the execution order that Developers had obtained in 
Developers' Separate Action (which execution order was referred to in the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement as the "Court's Order"). (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F).) However, 
the term "Indemnitors' Assets" in the March 2008 Settlement Agreement was defined to be 
only some of the assets covered by Developers' execution order. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at 
Recital F, pp. 2-3), 1626, 1632-33 (Tab I at pp. 7-8).) 
As set forth in Recital F of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, the execution order 
that Developers had obtained in Developers' Separate Action had authorized it to execute on 
all of the assets of MYI and the Youngs in the amount of $540,668.61, including but not 
limited to eight categories of specifically listed assets and asset types. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A 
at Recital F, pp. 2-3); 1626,1632-33 (Tab I).) The relevant part of the execution order was 
quoted in Recital F of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement as follows: 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
-12-
DECREED that pursuant to URCP 64C and URCP 64D, Developers may 
execute, attach and garnish, in the amount of $540,668.61, the accounts 
receivable, assets, interest, money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real 
property, and personal property in which the Indemnitors [MYI and the 
Youngs] have an interest, including but not limited to the following: 
1. Merrick Young 
Stephanie Young 
3511 Paiute Road 
St. George or Bloomington, Utah 84790-7741 
The above real property known as 3511 Paiute 
Road and any funds obtained from its sale, 
including all other assets of the Indemnitors. 
2. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either 
individually or collectively, for the project known 
as Black Ridge Drive, 250 West Improvement, 
Project SID 99-4, Inquiry No. 00-1260 
3. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either 
individually or collectively, for the project known 
as River Road, Project No. STP-3196(1)0. 
4. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either 
individually or collectively, from General 
Contractor, La Farge, N.A., for the project known 
as 1-15 Sevier River Northward Project, Project 
No.: *IM-NH-15-5(31)200. 
5. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either 
individually or collectively, from General 
Contractor, Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc., for 
the project known as UDOT 1-15 North 
Interchange, Project No.: IM-15-2-3861. 
6. Any equity in any other real property, business or 
asset in which any Indemnitor has any interest. 
7. Any money, stocks, bonds, or other assets of any 
Indemnitor. 
8. Any interest in Black Ridge Commercial Center, 
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LLC; Black Ridge, LLC, or any other partnership, 
limited partnership, limited liability company, 
sole proprietorship, corporation, or other business 
entity in which any Indemnitor has an interest, 
and any real property in which these entities have 
an interest. 
(R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3); 1632-33 (Tab I at pp. 7-8) (emphasis added).) 
However, "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined in Recital F of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement to mean only the assets specifically listed in paragraphs 1-8 of the 
execution order quoted in that recital. (R. 1674 (Tab A at Recital F, p. 3).) Recital F of the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement added the following language at the end of its quotation 
from the execution order (which language was not present in the execution order itself): "All 
assets referenced in paragraphs 1 through 8 of the Court's Order [Developers' 
execution order] are referred to in this Agreement as 'Indemnitors' Assets.'" (R. 1674 
(Tab A at Recital F, p. 3 (emphasis added)); 1632-33 (Tab I at pp. 7-8).) 
As such, although the execution order, as set forth in Recital F of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement, had provided that Developers could execute on all of MYI's and the 
Youngs' assets, including but not limited to the eight categories of assets, the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement provided that only the eight categories of assets were the 
"Indemnitors' Assets" that were transferred to Mr. Seely. (R. 1674, 1676-77 (Tab A at 
Recital F, p. 3 and Tf 2).) The "Indemnitors' Assets" were defined in the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement to be limited only the eight categories of assets lists in Recital F, 
rather than all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. (R. 1674 (Tab A at Recital F, p. 3.) 
As discussed below, the trial court interpreted categories 6 and 7 of the "Indemnitors' 
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Assets" to unambiguously mean, on their face, all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. (R. 
3280,3282-83 (Tab B at pp. 3-4), 4152-53 (Tab C at p. 2).) However, category 6 on its face 
referred only to assets in which MYI and/or the Youngs had an equity interest, such as real 
property. Category 6 stated: "Any equity in any other real property, business or assets in 
which any Indemnitor has an interest." (R. 1674 (Tab A at Recital F, p. 3).). Category 7 on 
its face referred only to liquid assets such as stocks, bonds and other similar assets. Category 
7 stated: "Any money, stocks, bonds or other assets of any Indemnitor." (R. 1674 (Tab A at 
Recital F, p. 3).) 
As discussed below, the trial court interpreted the term "Indemnitors' Assets" by 
referring to MYI's and the Youngs' pledge of assets to Developers in connection with the 
issuance of Developers' performance bonds in MYI's favor, which pledge had included "all 
sums due or to become due on all other contracts . . . in which [MYI or the Youngs] has any 
interest, together with any notes, accounts receivable or chose in action related thereto." (R. 
1673 (Tab A at Recital D, p. 2).) However, the term "Indemnitors' Assets" was not defined 
in the March 2004 Settlement Agreement by reference to that pledge and the eight categories 
of assets that defined the "Indemnitors' Assets" did not include "all sums due or to become 
due on all other contracts . . . in which [MYI] has any interest, together with any . . . chose 
in action related thereto." (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3).) 
The Subject Claims constituted a significant asset of MYI at the time the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement was executed, as they were pending at that time and sought recovery 
of approximately $1.3 million. (R. 13-26.) The term "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined to 
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include specifically referenced construction projects on which MYI had worked and as to 
which MYI had then-pending claims for payment of money. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital 
F, pp. 2-3).) However, that definition did not refer to the Wal-Mart project that was the 
subject of the Amended Complaint or to the Subject Claims for payment of money. (R. 13, 
1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3).) The listing of the "Indemnitors' Assets" only referred 
to the Black Ridge Project, the River Road Project, the "Sevier River Northward Project" and 
the "UDOT 1-15 Project" and related claims, none of which were the Wal-Mart project or 
the Subject Claims. (R. 1674 (Tab A at Recital F, p. 3).) 
The Subject Claims were accompanied by potential counterclaim liability at the time 
the March 2004 Settlement Agreement was executed. (R. 37-57.) However, the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement did not address assignment of this potential liability (either by a carve-
out or an indemnity provision). (R. 1672-80 (Tab A).) 
C. Mr. Seely and MYI Never Intended, Under the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, that the "Indemnitors' Assets" Included the Subject Claims, 
and Offered Extrinsic Evidence that there Was No Such Intent 
Mr. Seely stated in declaration testimony that he did not understand the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement to have transferred to him the Subject Claims and disclaimed 
ownership of the Subject Claims. (R. 3217-17b (Tab E).) Mr. Seely attached a copy of the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement to his September 26,2007 declaration and stated in that 
declaration under oath as follows: 
At the time I signed the [March 2004 Settlement Agreement], I was generally 
aware of a dispute between MYI, Wal-Mart and others. I did not understand 
that the [March 2004 Settlement Agreement] gave me any right or interest 
with respect to the above-captioned litigation [the instant action] nor did 
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I expect to receive any such right or interest. The first time I learned that 
anyone was asserting that I had any right or interest with respect to the 
litigation was when the defendants sought to join me as a party in this 
litigation. I have not at any time, nor do I now, claim any right or interest 
in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
(R. 3217a (Tab E at If 5) (emphasis added).) 
In his reply to the Second Amended Counterclaim, Mr. Seely denied that: (1) he 
owned the Subject Claims, under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement or otherwise, and 
(2) he was the proper plaintiff on the Subject Claims. (R. 3286, 3292-93 (Tab F at pp. 6-9, 
ffl[ 49-72).) Mr. Seely affimiatively alleged "he does not claim any right or interest in or with 
respect to the above-captioned litigation" and that the claims against him were barred 
"because Seely does not claim any right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned 
litigation." (R. 3292, 3297 (Tab F at p. 7, ^ 61, p. 12).) 
Even in the October 2008 settlement agreement between ESI, Wal-Mart, American 
Insurance and Mr. Seely, by which Mr. Seely stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of the 
Subject Claims, Mr. Seely still did not take the position that he had any interest, much less 
exclusive interest, in the Subject Claims. (R. 4111-14 (Tab G).) Mr. Seely purported to 
stipulate to the dismissal of the Subject Claims without ever acknowledging that he has any 
interest in the claims. (R. 4111-14 (Tab G).) The October 2008 settlement agreement stated 
in relevant part: 
SEELY makes no representations or warranties of any kind that the 
Court's [April 10,2008 Ruling on Seely's Motion to Dismiss] is correct or that 
he in fact acquired, has ever held or now holds any claims (including [the 
Subject Claims]) against any of ESI, WAL-MART, or AIC. 
SEELY . . . hereby releases, discharges and acquits ESI, WAL-MART, and 
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AIC . . . of and from any and all claims (including [the Subject Claims]). . . 
SEELY makes no representations or warranties of any kind with 
respect to whether he acquired, has ever held or now holds any such 
claims (including [the Subject Claims]). 
(R. 4111-12 (Tab G at Recital E and ^ 1) (emphasis added).) 
MYI made an offer of proof that its principal at the time of the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, Merrick Young, would testify that there was no intent to transfer the Subject 
Claims under that agreement. (R. 4122,4127 (Tab H at p. 6).) Other assets of MYI and the 
Youngs not specified in the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, in addition to the Subject 
Claims, were left with MYI or the Youngs. (R. 4126 (Tab H at p. 5).) 
The alleged interim owner of the Subject Claims, Developers, did not take the position 
that it owned the Subject Claims, and never exercised control over those claims. (R. 1431-
32.) 
MYI continued to prosecute the Subject Claims after March 2004 without 
interruption. Mr. Seely never exercised any control over the Subject Claims after March 
2004. (R. 3217a (Tab E at If 5).) MYI denied ESFs allegations that MYI had transferred to 
Mr. Seely the Subject Claims. (R. 3186, 3192, 3195-98.) 
D. The Trial Court Dismissed the Subject Claims Upon Its Interpretation of 
the March 2004 Settlement Agreement as Unambiguously Providing for 
the Transfer of the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely, and Did Not Consider 
Either the Reasonableness of Mr. Seely's and MYI's Claimed 
Interpretation or Their Extrinsic Evidence 
The trial court interpreted the March 2004 Settlement Agreement in two decisions in 
which the trial court decided Mr. Seely was the owner of the Subject Claims, first to the 
effect that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Seely and second to the effect 
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that Mr. Seely could stipulate to the dismissal with prejudice of the Subject Claims. 
In the April 10,2008 Ruling on Seely's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court decided it 
had jurisdiction over Mr. Seely on the basis that Mr. Seely had the right to control the Subject 
Claims under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 3280,3282 (Tab B at p. 3).) The 
trial court recited facts regarding the March 2004 Settlement Agreement and events leading 
to that agreement, including MYI's and the Youngs' pledge of assets to Developers and 
Developers obtaining the execution order. (R. 3280-82 (Tab B at pp. 1-3).) The trial court 
asserted that the execution order had referred to the assets on which Developers could 
execute as the "Indemnitors' Assets," even though that term existed only in the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement, and not the execution order. (R. 3281 (Tab B at p. 2), 1632-33 (Tab 
I at pp. 7-8).) The trial court interpreted categories 6 and 7 of the "Indemnitors' Assets" to 
cover all of MYI's assets so as to include the Subject Claims. (R. 3282-83 (Tab B at pp. 3-
4).) The trial court ruled that, because Mr. Seely had acquired "all of the assets of MYI and 
its principals during the pendency of this action by MYI," Mr. Seely could and should have 
anticipated that he would be subject to the trial court's jurisdiction. (R. 3283 (Tab B at p. 4).) 
Nonetheless, the trial court stated that MYI remained a valid plaintiff in the case. (R. 3283 
(Tab Bat p. 4).) 
The trial court's analysis in the April 10,2008 Ruling on Seely's Motion to Dismiss, 
in relevant part, was as follows: 
Regardless of whether Mr. Seely covertly controlled the prosecution of this 
action after 2004 or he deliberately or negligently allowed MYI to continue to 
control it, Mr. Seely had the right to control MYI's claims in this case. The 
specification of certain lawsuits transferred to Mr. Seely in the [March 
2004 Settlement Agreement] does not obviate the general language therein 
which also gave Mr. Seely "[a]ny equity in any other . . . asset in which 
any Indemnitor has an interest" and "[a]ny . . . other assets of any 
Indemnitor." The chose in action upon which MYI sued defendants in 
this case is one such asset, and Mr. Seely owns it. For these reasons, this 
Court has previously ruled that Mr. Seely as the assignee and real party in 
interest, should be joined as a plaintiff. 
This does not mean that Mr. Seely steps into MYFs shoes for all 
purposes. ESI does not seek to subject Mr. Seely to its original counterclaims 
against MYI, but ESI does assert that it has claims against Mr. Seely which 
accrued after he acquired his rights to MYFs claims in 2004. Having 
acquired all of the assets of MYI and its principals during the pendency 
of this action by MYI, Mr. Seely could and should have anticipated that this 
would subject him to the jurisdiction of this Court for his acts and omissions 
as to the ownership of the chose of action in this case. Consequently, there is 
nothing wrong or unreasonable or unfair in requiring Mr. Seely to respond to 
ESFs claims, and this Court has jurisdiction sufficient to do so. 
(R. 3282-83 (Tab B at pp. 3-4 (emphasis added)).) 
The trial court did not address Mr. Seely's declaration testimony that he did not 
understand the March 2004 Settlement Agreement to have transferred to him the Subject 
Claims and that he disclaimed ownership of the claims. (R. 3280-83 (Tab B at pp. 1-4).) 
Subsequently, in the January 21,2009 Ruling of Dismissal, the trial court decided that 
Mr. Seely could stipulate to the dismissal of the Subject Claims on the basis that Mr. Seely 
owned those claims under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 4152-54 (Tab C).) 
MYI argued in opposition to defendants' November 24,2008 Motion to Dismiss with 
Prejudice that Mr. Seely lacked standing to stipulate to the dismissal of the Subject Claims 
because: (1) ESFs claims for relief that Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims still needed to 
be adjudicated, and (2) the Subject Claims had not been transferred to Mr. Seely under the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement. (R. 4122-27 (Tab H).) MYI argued the "Indemnitors' 
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Assets" did not include the Subject Claims because: (1) the "Indemnitors' Assets" were 
limited to only eight categories of specifically listed assets, rather than all of the MYI's and 
the Youngs' assets, (2) the Subject Claims were not included in categories 6 or 7 because 
MYI did not have an equity interest in the claims and the claims were not a liquid asset akin 
to money, stocks or bonds, (3) there was no specific reference to the Subject Claims, which 
were a significant asset of MYI, even though the definition of "Indemnitors' Assets" 
included references to specific claims. (R. 4126-27 (Tab H at pp. 5-6).) MYI argued that 
extrinsic evidence demonstrated there had been no intent to include the Subject Claims in the 
"Indemnitors' Assets, including Mr. Seely's statement of non-ownership of the Subject 
Claims in his declaration filed in support of his motion to dismiss, Mr. Seely's assertions of 
non-ownership of the Subject Claims in his reply to the Second Amended Counterclaim, and 
Mr. Seely's reservation of his position that he did not own the Subject Claims in the October 
2008 settlement agreement. (R. 4124-25 (Tab H at pp. 3-4).) MYI offered testimony of 
MYI's principal that there had been no such intent. (R. 4127 (Tab H at p. 6).) MYI also 
pointed out that other assets, besides the Subject Claims, had been left with MYI and the 
Youngs, over which Mr. Seely never exercised control. (R. 4126 (Tab H at p. 5).) 
In response, in the January 21, 2009 Ruling of Dismissal, the trial court stated it 
already had decided in its April 10,2008 Ruling on Seely's Motion to Dismiss that Mr. Seely 
owned the Subject Claims, and reiterated and expanded upon its decision that Mr. Seely 
owned the Subject Claims. (R. 4152-54 (Tab C at pp. 1-3).) The trial court made clear that 
it interpreted the term "Indemnitors' Assets" to unambiguously mean all of MYI's and the 
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Youngs' assets existing at the time that agreement was executed, by reference to MYFs 
pledge to Developers and by interpreting categories 6 and 7 of the "Indemnitors" Assets" to 
unambiguously mean, on their face, all of MYFs and the Youngs' assets. (R. 4152-54 (Tab 
C at pp. 1-3.) As such, the trial court interpreted the March 2004 Settlement Agreement on 
its face as unambiguously providing for the transfer of the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely. (R. 
4152-54 (Tab Cat pp. 1-3.) 
In the January 21, 2009 Ruling of Dismissal, the trial court stated in relevant part as 
follows (all of the bracketed and parenthetical language, definitions and citations were by the 
trial court): 
In a Ruling entered April 10,2008, the Court concluded that Mr. Seely 
is the owner of the claims made by MYI in this case, so that it is proper for the 
Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. Since MYI does not appear 
to understand that Ruling completely, the Court will restate in greater detail its 
analysis of the "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" (the 
"Agreement") executed by Mr. Seely, MYI and its two principals, the 
Developers Surety and Indemnity Company ("Developers") in March and 
April 2004. The critical elements of that Agreement are as follows: 
a. Developers, MYI and its two principals had previously entered 
into an Indemnity Agreement in which MYI and its two 
principals assigned to Developers, for security purposes, several 
property rights, including "all sums due or to become due on all 
. . . contracts, covenants and agreements . . . in which [MYI] 
and its two principals] has [sic] any interest, together with any 
chose in action related thereto" (Agreement, p. 2, reciting 
T| 7 of the Indemnity Agreement.) 
b. In another action filed in this court, Developers obtained a 
judgment against MYI and its two principals which ordered that 
Developers could execute against "Any equity in any other . . . 
asset in which [MYI or its two principals] has any interest" as 
well as "Any . . . other assets of [MYI or its two principals]." 
(Agreement, p. 3.) 
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c. The Agreement provided that "MYI and its two principals] 
confirm and aver that [they] have assigned, transferred, and set 
over to Developers any and all interest, rights, and title that 
[MYI and its two principals] possess or may possess to [their] 
assets." (Agreement, p. 5, ^  2.b.) 
d. The Agreement further provided that Mr. Seely would pay 
Developers $150,000, for which Developers "hereby assigns, 
transfers, and sets over to Seely all [MYFs and its two 
principals'] Assets," with exceptions which are not relevant to 
the instant case. (Agreement, pp. 5-6, ^ 2.d.) 
e. This case was commenced by the Complaint filed by MYI on 
May 4, 2001, nearly three years before the Agreement was 
executed by MYI, so the claims made by MYI in this case 
constituted a chose of action - a right to make a claim in a 
lawsuit - which, regardless of its value or the likelihood of its 
success, constituted an asset of MYI which MYI transferred to 
Developers, and Developers transferred to Mr. Seely, in 2004. 
f. Accordingly, Mr. Seely now has the right to pursue the claims 
filed by MYI in this case or to settle them. 
(R. 4153-54 (Tab C at pp. 2-3).) 
In paragraph (a) of this ruling, the trial court relied upon MYI's pledge of assets to 
Developers in connection with Developers' issuance of performance bonds in favor of MYI 
in order to interpret the term "Indemnitors' Assets," even though that term was not defined 
by reference to that pledge. (R. 4153 (Tab C at p. 2), 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3).) 
In paragraph (b) of this ruling, the trial court made clear it interpreted categories 6 and 7 of 
the "Indemnitors" Assets" to each mean all of the assets of MYI and the Youngs. (R. 4153 
(Tab C at p. 2).) In paragraphs (c) and (d) of this ruling, the trial court made clear it 
interpreted the term "Indemnitors' Assets" to mean all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. (R. 
4153 (Tab Cat p. 2).) 
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The trial court decided it would not consider the extrinsic evidence of Mr. Seely's 
statements and assertions that he did not own the Subject Claims and MYI's offer of proof 
that MYFs principal did not intend the March 2004 Settlement Agreement to effectuate a 
transfer of the Subject Claims. (R. 4154 (Tab C at p. 3).) On this point, the trial court stated 
as follows in the January 21, 2009 Ruling of Dismissal: 
MYI identifies no ambiguity in the [March 2004 Settlement] Agreement. . . 
and the Court finds none. The intent of the parties to the Agreement is clearly 
expressed in the written terms of the Agreement and an objective reading of 
the Agreement leads to the Court's conclusions. Consideration of extrinsic 
evidence to prove a different intent would not be consistent with the rules of 
construction or rules of evidence. 
(R. 4154 (Tab Cat p. 3).) 
The trial court entered the Order of Dismissal based upon its interpretation of the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement as providing for the transfer of the Subject Claims to Mr. 
Seely. According to the trial court, because the Subject Claims had been transferred to Mr. 
Seely, Mr. Seely could stipulate to the Order of Dismissal as he purported to do in the 
October 2008 settlement agreement. (R. 4154 (Tab C at p. 3).) The trial court stated: 
"Accordingly, Mr. Seely now has the right to pursue the claims filed by MYI in this case or 
to settle them." (R. 4154 (Tab C at p. 3).) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's interpretation of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement as 
unambiguously, on its face, providing for the transfer of the Subject Claims to Mr. Seely, 
which was the basis of the Order of Dismissal, was error under Utah law regarding 
interpretation of contracts. Under settled Utah law, if contested contract language is 
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reasonably susceptible to being interpreted as claimed by a party offering relevant and 
credible extrinsic evidence regarding the intention of the parties to the contract as to that 
language, a trial court errs by interpreting the contract as being unambiguous and having a 
contrary plain meaning based upon the contract language alone, without considering the 
extrinsic evidence. Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass 'n.. 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); 
Dairies v. Vincent. 2008 UT 5L \ 26-3 L 190 P.3d 1269. 
The language defining the term "Indemnitors' Assets" is reasonably susceptible to 
being interpreted, as claimed by Mr. Seely and MYI, as not including the Subject Claims, if 
not reasonably susceptible to only that interpretation: 
(1) "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined in that agreement to be limited to only some 
of the assets covered by the execution order that Developers had obtained in Developers' 
Separate Action. Although, as set forth in the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, the 
execution order had provided Developers could execute on all of MYI5s and the Youngs' 
assets, including but not limited to eight categories of specifically listed assets, the assets that 
were transferred under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, the "Indemnitors' Assets," 
were limited to only the eight categories that had served to identify particular assets on which 
Developers could have executed out of all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. 
(2) Categories 6 and 7 of the "Indemnitors' Assets" (which the trial court had 
interpreted as argued by ESI to cover all of MYFs assets) were limited to, respectively, assets 
in which MYI and the Youngs had an equity interest and liquid assets, none of which covered 
the Subject Claims. 
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(3) Even though the definition of the term "Indemnitors' Assets" included 
references to specific projects on which MYI had worked and had claims for money, that 
definition did not refer to the Wal-Mart project that is the subject of the Amended Complaint 
or to the Subject Claims, which were significant assets of MYI at the time the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement was executed. 
(4) The trial court's interpretation improperly rendered the listing of the eight 
categories of the "Indemnitors' Assets" redundant and meaningless. 
Because the language defining the term "Indemnitors' Assets" is reasonably 
susceptible to being interpreted as not including the Subject Claims, if not reasonably 
susceptible only to that interpretation, the trial court erred in not considering the extrinsic 
evidence offered by Mr. Seely and MYI either to properly interpret that definition by its plain 
terms or to resolve any facial ambiguity as to the meaning of that term. 
Mr. Seely's and MYI's extrinsic evidence conclusively showed that the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" were not intended to include the Subject Claims. There was no relevant and credible 
evidence showing a contrary intent. 
MYI was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to properly interpret the term 
"Indemnitors' Assets" according to the intent of the parties to the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, as expressed in that agreement and as shown by Mr. Seely's and MYI's extrinsic 
evidence as to those parties' intent. The trial court's erroneous interpretation of the term 
"Indemnitors' Assets" was the basis of its ruling that Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims. 
This ownership ruling was the basis of the Order of Dismissal, which required Mr. Seely's 
stipulation to the dismissal of the Subject Claims as if he owned them. As a result, MYI had 
its claims for relief dismissed based upon a ruling on a Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) motion to which 
it was not a party, and without an adjudication, in which MYI could be heard, of ESI's claims 
for relief that Mr. Seely owned the claims. MYI had its claims for relief against ESI 
voluntarily dismissed based upon the stipulation of a party who was an involuntary plaintiff 
upon ESI's motion, and who disclaimed ownership of those claims for relief. MYI had its 
claims for relief dismissed without an adjudication of those claims on their merits, after 
having alone earned the burden and cost of prosecuting those claims since 2001, and without 
receiving any consideration. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court entered the Order of Dismissal based upon its rulings that Mr. Seely 
owned the Subject Claims under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement and, thus, could 
stipulate to the Order of Dismissal. The trial court ruled Mr. Seely owned the Subject Claims 
under the March 2004 Settlement Agreement by interpreting the term "Indemnitors' Assets" 
in that agreement to mean all of the assets of MYI (and the Youngs) existing at the time that 
agreement was executed. The trial court interpreted the term "Indemnitors' Assets" based 
solely on the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement by interpreting categories 
6 and 7 of the "Indemnitors' Assets" on their face to have covered all of MYI's (and the 
Youngs') assets. Without any analysis of whether the definition of the term "Indemnitors' 
Assets" was reasonably susceptible to Mr. Seely's and MYI's claimed interpretation, the trial 
court ruled that there was no ambiguity such that it would not consider Mr. Seely's and 
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MYFs extrinsic evidence regarding their intent in entering into the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, which, the trial court ruled, was a "different intent" than that plainly expressed 
by the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
I. Under A Settled Utah Rule Of Contract Interpretation, The Trial Court Erred 
In Interpreting The Term "Indemnitors' Assets" As Unambiguously Providing 
For The Transfer Of The Subject Claims Without Considering Mr. Seely's And 
MYFs Extrinsic Evidence As To A Contrary Intent, Because The Language 
Defining That Term Was Reasonably Susceptible To Being Interpreted To Not 
Include The Subject Claims 
Under Utah law, interpretation of contracts is a matter of determining the intentions 
of the parties to the contract, which are controlling. WebBank. 2002 UT 88 at K 17. The 
parties' intentions may be determined from the plain meaning of the contract language, but 
only if the contract language is without facial ambiguity. Ward. 907 P.2d at 268. "An 
ambiguity exists in a contract term or provision 'if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of "uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'" WebBank. 2002 UT 88 at % 20. 
A trial court is required to consider relevant and credible extrinsic evidence as to the 
intentions of the parties to the contract at the time of contracting in order to determine 
whether there is a facial ambiguity. Ward. 907 P.2d at 268 ("When determining whether a 
contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered." (Emphasis added)); 
Dawes. 2008 UT 51 at *f 26. However, a facial ambiguity can exist only if the two 
competing interpretations are both reasonable, tenable or plausible when considering the 
contract language that was used. Dawes. 2008 UT 51 at Tfij 26-31. 
Thus, where interpretation of a contract term is at issue, the trial court must first 
consider a party's relevant and credible extrinsic evidence regarding the intentions of the 
parties to the contract as to the meaning of the contested contract language and then decide 
whether that language is reasonably susceptible to that party' s claimed interpretation. Ward. 
907 P.2d at 268: Dairies. 2008 UT 51 at ffl[ 26-31. If the contract language is reasonably 
susceptible to the party's claimed interpretation, the trial court must interpret the contested 
contract language based upon the extrinsic evidence (that is, the trial court must decide the 
intentions of the parties to the contract based upon the extrinsic evidence) and cannot 
interpret the contract as being unambiguous under the contract's plain terms (that is, the trial 
court cannot decide the intentions of the parties to the contract from the contract language 
alone). Ward. 901?.2d at 26%: Dames. 2008 UT 51 at ffi[ 26-31. Conversely, if the extrinsic 
evidence is offered to support a claimed interpretation that is implausible or unreasonable 
under the language used in the contract, there is no facial ambiguity and the intent of the 
parties (the interpretation of the contested contract language) can be decided from the 
contract language alone. Ward. 907 P.2d at 268: Darner 2008 UT 51 at ffif 26-31. 
The Utah Supreme Court has referred to this as the "Ward rule" which is set forth as 
follows in the Ward decision. 
When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence 
must be considered— A judge then should therefore consider any credible 
evidence offered to show the parties' intention. 
If after considering such evidence, the court determines that the interpretations 
contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract, then 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguous terms. Conversely, 
if after considering such evidence, the court determines that the language of 
on 
the contract is not ambiguous, then the parties intentions must be determined 
solely from the language of the contract. 
Ward. 907 P.2d at 268 (emphasis added, citations omitted). The 'Ward rule" was further 
explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Dairies as follows: 
In Ward we set forth a two-part standard for determining facial 
ambiguity. First, we indicated that "[wjhen determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be considered. Otherwise the 
determination of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely, it is based solely 
on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and 
experience.'" Second, after a judge considers relevant and credible evidence 
of contrary interpretations, the judge must ensure that "the interpretation 
contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract." 
As illustrated by our line of facial ambiguity cases, the two-part Ward 
rule requires that a judge first review relevant and credible extrinsic evidence 
offered to demonstrate that there is in fact an ambiguity. After reviewing the 
evidence offered, the Ward rule justifies a finding of ambiguity only if the 
competing interpretations are "reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract. "Conversely, there can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered 
in an attempt to obscure otherwise plain contractual terms. Thus, even though 
we permit admission of extrinsic evidence to support a claim of ambiguity in 
contractual language, the claim "must be plausible and reasonable in light of 
the language used." 
2008 UT 51 at ffl[ 26, 31 (citations omitted). 
Under the "Wardrule," whether a trial court errs in refusing to consider relevant and 
credible extrinsic evidence regarding the intentions of the parties to a contract in order to 
interpret a contract depends upon whether that evidence was offered to support an 
interpretation that is plausible and reasonable under the contested language. Ward. 907 P.2d 
at 268-69; Daines. 2008 UT 51 at fflf 26-31. If contested contract language is reasonably 
susceptible to being interpreted as claimed by the party offering the extrinsic evidence, a trial 
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court errs by interpreting the contract as being unambiguous and having a contrary plain 
meaning based upon the contract language alone, without considering the extrinsic evidence. 
See Ward. 907 P.2d at 268-69: Dames. 2008 UT 51 at ffi[ 26-31. In Ward, the Utah Supreme 
Court held as follows: 
Because the language of the agreement is reasonably susceptible to Ward's 
contended interpretation, we conclude that it is ambiguous, and any evidence 
relevant to prove its meaning is admissible. Indeed, exclusion of such 
evidence would deny the relevance of the parties' intentions and defeat the 
principle of contract interpretation that uthe intentions of the parties are 
controlling." Furthermore, excluding such evidence would by no means gut 
the purpose of the parol evidence rule, which is "to limit the ability of the 
finder of fact (the jury) to believe testimony contradicting integrated writings. 
This is not a case where the extrinsic evidence, if believed by the fact finder, 
would contradict the parties' written agreement. 
907 P.2d at 269 (citations omitted). 
Under the "Ward rule," the trial court below erred in interpreting the term 
"Indemnitors' Assets" without considering the extrinsic evidence offered by Mr. Seely and 
MYI regarding their intent as to that tenn. The trial court got it backwards by first 
interpreting the tenn "Indemnitors' Assets" as claimed by ESI to unambiguously mean all 
of MYFs and the Youngs' assets based upon the contract language alone and without 
consideration of the reasonableness of Mr. Seely's and MYFs claimed interpretation, and 
then refusing to consider Mr. Seely's and MYFs extrinsic evidence on the basis there 
allegedly was no ambiguity and their evidence showed an intent that allegedly was different 
than the intent expressed by the contract's plain language. 
The issue of the meaning of the tenn "Indemnitors' Assets was raised below by ESI 
and pitted ESI, a stranger to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, against Mr. Seely and 
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MYI, who were parties to the that agreement. ESI claimed that term meant all of MYI's and 
the Youngs' assets existing at the time the March 2004 Settlement Agreement was executed 
so as to include the Subject Claims. In response, Mr. Seely and MYI claimed that term did 
not include the Subject Claims. 
The following demonstrates that the language of the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement defining the term "Indemnitors' Assets" is reasonably susceptible to being 
interpreted as claimed by Mr. Seely and MYI to not include the Subject Claims, if not 
reasonably susceptible to only being interpreted as such: 
(1) The difference between the assets that Developers could have executed on 
under its execution order and the assets that comprised the "Indemnitors' Assets" under the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement, which difference was set forth in Recital F of that 
agreement, shows that the "Indemnitors' Assets" were not intended to include all of MYFs 
and the Youngs' assets. The term "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined by reference to the 
execution order that Developers had obtained in Developers' Separate Action. (R. 1673-74 
(Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3).) As set forth in Recital F, that execution order plainly had 
provided that Developers could have executed on all of MYFs and the Youngs' assets, 
including but not limited to the eight categories of assets that were specifically listed in that 
order. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3).) As such, as set forth in Recital F, the eight 
categories of assets listed in that execution order were not all of MYI's and the Youngs' 
assets, but served to identify particular assets that Developers could have executed on out of 
all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. This follows from the rule that "including but not 
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limited to" clauses, by definition, are not exhaustive listings of all items included in the 
general category referred to by the clause, but merely serve to illustrate particular items that 
are included in the general category. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. 
Co.. 78 F.3d 202, 206-07 (5th Cir. 19961 The term "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined in 
Recital F to be limited to only the eight categories of assets. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital 
F, pp. 2-3).) Given that use of the phrase "including but not limited to" in the execution 
order expressly meant MYI had assets that were not listed in the eight categories, the fact that 
the "Indemnitors' Assets" was limited to only the eight categories meant there was no intent 
that this term included all of MYFs assets. If there had been such intent, the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" would have been defined to mean all of the assets covered by the execution order, 
rather than only the eight categories of assets that identified particular assets that Developers 
could have executed on out of all of MYFs assets.6 
(2) Categories 6 and 7 of the "Indemnitors' Assets," on their face, respectively 
covered only MYFs and the Youngs' assets in which they had an equity interest or all of 
MYFs and the Young's liquid assets such as money, stocks and bonds, rather than all of 
MYFs and the Youngs' assets. See Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton. LLC. 2009 UT 
27, Iff 25. 34. 207 R3d 1235 ("c[U]nder the well-established rule of construction ejusdem 
generis,' we determine the meaning of a general contractual term based on the specific 
6
 Or, if there had been an intent to transfer all of MYFs and the Youngs' assets, the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement could have avoided using the execution order language 
altogether to define the "Indemnitors' Assets" and simply defined that term to mean all of 
MYFs and the Young's assets. 
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enumerations that surround that term.").7 The crux of the trial court's interpretation of the 
term "Indemnitors' Assets" to mean all of MYFs and the Youngs' assets was its 
interpretation of categories 6 and 7 to mean all of MYFs and the Youngs' assets. (R. 3281-
83 (Tab B at pp. 2-4), 4153 (Tab C at p. 2).) However, category 6 did not state "all of 
Indemnitors' assets" or "all of Indemnitors' other assets." Instead, category 6 stated "Any 
equity in any other real property, business or asset in which any Indemnitor has an interest." 
(R. 1674 (Tab A at Recital F, p. 3).) This did not include the Subject Claims because MYI 
did not have an equity interest in those choses of actions; plaintiffs do not have an equity 
interest in their claims for relief. Category 6 on its face was a catch-all category of assets in 
which MYI and the Youngs had an equity interest (other than the specifically listed real 
property in category 1), rather than a reference to all of MYFs and the Youngs' assets, much 
less any claims for relief. Likewise, category 7 did not state "All of Indemnitors' assets" or 
"All of Indemnitors' other assets." Instead, category 7 stated "Any money, stocks, bonds, 
or other assets of any Indemnitor," which covered only liquid assets such as money, stocks 
and bonds. (R. 1674 (Tab A at Recital F, p. 3).) The Subject Claims were not an asset akin 
to "money, stocks, [or] bonds." See Cafe Rio. 2009 UT 27 at Tj 34. 
7
 In Cafe Rio, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the term "obstruction" under the 
principle ejusdem generis to be limited to barriers of similar type to those listed along with 
that term in the subject contract: "[Ujnder the principle ejusdem generis, the general term 
'obstruction'... should be construed according to the specific enumerations of 'fence, wall, 
[and] barricade,' that precede it. Under this interpretive framework, the term obstruction 
refers to those barriers that are similar to fences, walls, and barricades. A building is not 
similar in character or purpose to those barriers." 2009 UT 27 at *[  34. Here, under the 
principle ejusdem generis" the general term "asset" as used in categories 6 and 7 should be 
construed according to the specific enumerations of specific types of assets set forth in those 
categories. 
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(3) The difference between MYI's pledge of assets to Developers in connection 
with Developers' issuance of the performance bonds in favor of MYI (which had precipitated 
Developers' Separate Action) and the definition of the term "Indemnitors' Assets" in the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement demonstrates that not all of MYI's choses in action, 
including the Subject Claims, were included in the "Indemnitors' Assets." MYI's pledge had 
specifically included all choses in action relating to any contracts of MYI. (R. 1673 (Tab A 
at Recital D, p. 2).) However, none of the eight categories comprising the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" referred to "choses in action," much less to all of MYFs choses in action relating to 
any of MYI's contracts. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3).) To the contrary, the 
Recital F definition of the term "Indemnitors' Assets" included references to several specific 
projects and related claims for money owed to MYI, but did not refer to the specific Wal-
Mart project or its related Subject Claims for approximately $1.3 million owed to MYI, 
which was a significant asset of MYI at the time of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
(R. 13-26, 1674 (Tab A at Recital F, p. 3).) This meant it was intended that the Wal-Mart 
project and its related Subject Claims were excluded from the "Indemnitors' Assets." See 
Mifflin v. ShikL 293 P. L 3 (Utah 1930) ("The reference to one class of details, without 
inclusion of more, implies the exclusion of all not expressed, under the rule of Expressio 
unus, exclusio alterius"). 
(4) The March 2004 Settlement Agreement did not address the potential 
counterclaim liability that accompanied the Subject Claims. (R. 1672-80) (Tab A).) If there 
had been an intent to include the Subject Claims in the "Indemnitors' Assets," then the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement would have addressed this potential counterclaim 
liability. The fact that it did not meant it was not intended that those claims for relief were 
included in "Indemnitors' Assets." 
In contrast, the language defining the term "Indemnitors' Assets" is not reasonably 
susceptible to ESI's claimed interpretation adopted by the trial court as including the Subject 
Claims, or is at least less reasonably susceptible to that interpretation than to Mr. Seely's and 
MYI's claimed interpretation: 
(1) ESI's and the trial court's interpretation of the term "Indemnitors' Assets" to 
mean all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets hinged on their interpretation of categories 6 and 
7 of the "Indemnitors' Assets" to mean all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. (R. 3281-83 
(Tab B at pp. 2-4), 4153 (Tab C at p. 2).) However, as discussed above, categories 6 and 7, 
on their face, were limited to, respectively, all property in which MYI and the Youngs had 
an equity interest and all liquid assets of MYI and the Youngs, such as money, stocks and 
bonds. Moreover, interpreting categories 6 and 7 as covering all of MYI's and the Youngs' 
assets would incorrectly render those categories redundant and meaningless as to each other, 
and render the remaining categories of the "Indemnitors' Assets" redundant and meaningless. 
See Encon Utah LLC v. Flour Ames Kraemer, LLC. 2009 UT 7. y 28. 210 P.3d 263. One 
or the other of categories 6 and 7 would have no purpose if the other meant all of MYI's and 
the Youngs' assets; the remaining categories 1-5 and 8 also would have served no purpose 
if both categories 6 and 7 meant all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. 
(2) The trial court also relied upon the fact that MYI and the Youngs had pledged 
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to Developers all of their assets, including all of their choses in action, in the indemnity 
agreement between those parties. (R. 3280-81 (Tab B at pp. 1-2), 4153 (Tab C at p. 2).) 
However, the term "Indemnitors' Assets" was not defined in the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement to cover the assets that MYI and the Youngs had pledged to Developers. Instead, 
the term "Indemnitors' Assets" was defined by reference to Developers' execution order, and 
was defined to mean only the eight categories of assets that had been set forth in that 
execution order to identify particular assets that Developers could have executed on out of 
all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. (R. 1673-74 (Tab A at Recital F, pp. 2-3).) 
(3) The trial court also relied upon paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d) of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement to rule that all of MYI's assets existing at the time of that agreement 
had been transferred to Mr. Seely. (R. 4153 (Tab C at pp. 2).) However, paragraph 2(b) 
served to confirm that MYI and the Youngs had transferred to Developers only the 
"Indemnitors' Assets," rather than all of their assets, and paragraph 2(d) provided for the 
transfer from Developers to Mr. Seely of only the "Indemnitors' Assets" (excluding the 
Black Ridge Project and its related claims), rather than all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets. 
(R. 1676-77 (Tab A at pp. 5-6).) There was no basis in the language of paragraphs 2(b) and 
2(d) alone or together to interpret the term "Indemnitors' Assets" as meaning all of MYI's 
and the Youngs' assets, especially when the term "Indemnitors' Assets" was separately 
defined in Recital F of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement. 
This all demonstrates that the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement 
defining the term "Indemnitors' Assets" is reasonably susceptible to Mr. Seely's and MYI's 
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claimed interpretation, if not reasonably susceptible to only Mr. Seely's and MYI's 
interpretation. Thus, under the " JFiorrdrule," the trial court erred in interpreting the definition 
of the term "Indemnitors' Assets" as it did and not considering the extrinsic evidence 
presented and offered by Mr. Seely and MYI regarding their intent as to the meaning of that 
term. See Ward. 907 P.2d at 269: Dairies. 2008 UT 51 at ^j 25-31. The trial court 
erroneously determined that the language of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement was 
unambiguous on its face in favor of ESI in a manner that was contrary to a reasonable 
interpretation of that language, without consideration or analysis of whether Mr. Seely's and 
MYI's claimed interpretation was reasonable under that language, without considering Mr. 
Seely's and MYI's extrinsic evidence, and without considering that there was no extrinsic 
evidence supporting ESI's claimed interpretation. 
Mr. Seely's and MYI's extrinsic evidence showed that the term "Indemnitors' Assets" 
was not intended to include the Subject Claims, and served, under the "Wfardrule," either to 
support the only reasonable interpretation of the definition of that term under the plain 
contract language or to properly resolve any facial ambiguity. That extrinsic evidence made 
clear the parties to the March 2004 Settlement Agreement, whose intent is controlling, did 
not intend that the "Indemnitors' Assets" included the Subject Claims. Mr. Seely provided 
declaration testimony that he did not understand that he had received the Subject Claims 
under that agreement. (R. 3217a (Tab Eat^f 5).) Mr. Seely affirmatively alleged he had no 
interest in the Subject Claims. (R. 3292, 3297 (Tab F at pp. 7, 12).) MYI offered the 
testimony of its principal that there had been no intent to include the Subject Claims in the 
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"Indemnitors' Assets," and also evidence that MYI had continued to exercise control over 
assets after March 20004 other than the claims for relief that MYI, which showed that the 
intended meaning of the "Indemnitors' Assets" was not to include the Subject Claims. (R. 
4126-27 (Tab H at pp. 5-6).) MYI continued to prosecute the Subject Claims, and Mr. Seely 
never exercised control over the claims, consistent with their intent that the claims had not 
been transferred to Mr. Seely. (R. 3217a (Tab E at ^ | 5).) Developers never exercised control 
over the Subject Claims, also consistent with the intent that the claims were not included in 
the "Indemnitors'Assets." (R. 1431-32.) 
This extrinsic evidence showed an intent that supported and was entirely consistent 
with a reasonable interpretation of the tenn "Indemnitors' Assets," if not the only reasonable 
interpretation (which is demonstrated above), rather than, as ruled by the trial court, an intent 
that was "different" than the intent expressed by the plain language of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement. Mr. Seely and MYI did not offer their extrinsic evidence "in an 
attempt to obscure otherwise plain contractual terms," which, if they had, would have 
justified the trial court's refusal to consider the evidence. See Daines. 2008 UT 51 at j^ 31. 
Indeed, this case illustrates the reason for the "Ward rule," which is to acknowledge "the 
relevance of the parties' intentions" and adhere to "the principle of contract interpretation 
that 'the intentions of the parties are controlling.'" Ward. 907 P.2d at 269. The trial court 
interpreted the tenn "Indemnitors' Assets" as claimed by ESI without considering the 
reasonableness of Mr. Seely's or MYI's claimed interpretation of that tenn or their extrinsic 
evidence regarding their intent, even though ESI was a stranger to that contract and Mr. Seely 
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and MYI were parties to it. 
Even assuming the subject language was also reasonably susceptible to ESP s claimed 
interpretation such that there was a facial ambiguity, the extrinsic evidence that the trial court 
refused to consider was uncontested and controlling as to whether "Indemnitors' Assets" was 
intended to include the Subject Claims. Mr. Seely's extrinsic evidence alone is conclusive 
to show there was no such intent because, as the transferee and intended beneficiary of the 
transfer, it was in Mr. Seely's interest to have the term "Indemnitors' Assets" defined as 
expansively as possible. There was no relevant and credible extrinsic evidence that 
conflicted with Mr. Seely's and MYI's evidence and showed an intent that the "Indemnitors' 
Assets" meant all of MYI's and the Youngs' assets and included the Subject Claims. How 
could there be any conflicting evidence when MYI and Mr. Seely were the parties to the 
March 2004 Settlement Agreement? ESI, being a stranger to the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, could not offer any such evidence from its principals, employees or agents.8 
In sum, the trial court erred in interpreting the term "Indemnitors' Assets" as including 
the Subject Claims and ruling those claims had been transferred to Mr. Seely. The trial 
court's interpretation was contrary to the intent of the parties to the March 2004 Settlement 
Agreement, as expressed in that agreement and as demonstrated by the offered extrinsic 
8
 Moreover, even if the extrinsic evidence had not been conclusive, the trial court's 
interpretation still would have been error. Even if there had been conflicting extrinsic 
evidence, the term "Indemnitors' Assets" still would have had to be interpreted based upon 
the extrinsic evidence, once any conflict was resolved; the question of the intent of the parties 
to the March 2004 Settlement as to the meaning of that term simply would have become a 
question of fact to be decided based upon the conflicting extrinsic evidence. See Dairies^ 
2008UT51at^|24. 
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evidence regarding those parties' intent. 
II. MYI Was Prejudiced By The Trial Court's Error In Interpreting The Term 
"Indemnitors' Assets" Without Considering Mr. Seely's And MYFs Extrinsic 
Evidence Regarding Their Intent As To The Meaning Of That Term 
Absent the trial court's interpretation error, there would have been no basis for the 
Order of Dismissal. The trial court was able to enter the Order of Dismissal only if Mr. Seely 
was the owner of the Subject Claims. See Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). As such, only by having 
erroneously interpreted the March 2004 Settlement Agreement to have transferred the 
Subject Claims to Mr. Seely, based upon its erroneous interpretation of the term 
"Indemnitors' Assets" to mean all of MYFs and the Youngs' assets, was the trial court able 
to enter the Order of Dismissal. (R. 4152-54 (Tab C at pp. 1-3).) 
The trial court's interpretation of the March 2004 Settlement Agreement that was the 
basis of the Order of Dismissal originally was made in a ruling upon a Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) 
motion to dismiss as to which MYI was not a party. (R. 3280-84 (Tab B).) MYI had its 
claims for relief dismissed without an adjudication in which MYI was heard of ESI's 
declaratory judgment claims by which the ownership issue had been interjected in the case. 
Mr. Seely was able to stipulate to the Order of Dismissal, while continuing to disclaim 
ownership of the Subject Claims, only because ESI had maneuvered to have him joined as 
an involuntary plaintiff based upon ESI's meritless interpretation of the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement. Mr. Seely entered into that stipulation only because ESI had obtained 
leverage against him by asserting claims for relief against him, which were based ESI's 
meritless interpretation. This was all while the parties to the March 2004 Settlement 
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Agreement, who were the only parties able to weigh in on the intent of that agreement, 
agreed that ESTs interpretation was meritless. MYI had its claims for relief dismissed after 
alone having carried the burden of prosecuting those claims since their inception in 2001 and 
without either obtaining an adjudication of the claims on their merits or receiving any 
consideration for the dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, MYI respectfully submits that the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in interpreting the term "Indemnitors' Assets" as used in the March 2004 
Settlement Agreement and entering the Order of Dismissal based upon that erroneous 
interpretation. MYI respectfully requests that the Order of Dismissal be reversed and the 
matter remanded with instructions that the Subject Claims are re-instated and that the term 
"Indemnitors' Assets" in the March 2004 Settlement Agreement does not include the Subject 
Claims. 
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, MUTUAL RELEASE, AND ASSIGNMENT 
This Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release and Assignment (hereinafter "Agreement3') is made on 
this day of , 2004, by and between Developers Surety and Indemnity Company 
(hereinafter "Developers"); and Merrick Young Incorporated (hereinafter "MYI"), a Utah corporation; 
Merrick Young, an individual (hereinafter "Mr. Young"); Stephanie Young, an individual (hereinafter "Ms. 
Young"); and Clyde G. Seely, an individual (hereinafter "Seely"). All entities referenced above, axe 
collectively referred to as the "Parties". 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS: 
A. Developers issued Labor and Material Payment Bond and Performance Bond No. 870694P 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Black Ridge Bond"), with City of St George, as obligee, and MYI3 as 
principal, for the project known as Black Ridge Drive, 250 West Improvement, Project SID 99-4, Inquiry 
No. 00-1260 (hereinafter the "Black Ridge Project"). The amount, or penal sum, of the bond was 
$1,543,000.00. 
B. Developers issued Payment Bond and Performance Bond No. 870960P (hereinafter 
referred to as the "River Road Bond")> with the State of Utah by and through the Utah Department of 
Transportation, as obligee, and MYI, as principal, for the project known as River Road, Project No. 
STP-3196(1)0 (hereinafter the "River Road Project"). The penal sum of the bond was $1,229,229.00. 
C. Developers Insurance Company merged into Developers, and Developers assumed all 
assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of Developers Insurance Company. 
D. MYI, Mr. Young, and Ms. Young (collectively referred to as "Indemnitors") entered into 
an Indemnity Agreement, GIA No. 75605-01, (hereinafter "GIA") with Developers wherein Indemnitors 
agreed, among other things, to fully defend and indemnify Developers from and against any and all loss 
incurred as a consequence of issuing any bonds in favor of MYI and to assign to Developers accounts 
receivable and contracts. The pertinent portions of these promises are set forth in paragraphs 1 and 7 of 
the GIA, as follows: 
1. INDEMNIFICATION. In consideration of the execution and 
delivery by Surety of a Bond or any Bonds on behalf of Principal, 
Principal and Indemnitor shall pay all premiums charged by Surety in 
connection with any Bond (including extensions, renewals or 
modifications) issued by Surety on behalf of Principal and shall indemnify 
and hold Surety harmless from and against any and all liability, loss, 
claims, demands, costs, damages, attorneys' fees and expenses of 
whatever kind or nature, together with interest thereon at the maximum 
rate allowed by law, which Surety may sustain or 
incur by reason of or in consequence of the execution and delivery by 
Surety of any Bond on behalf of Principal, whether or not Surety shall 
have paid any amount on account thereof,.... 
5ertcnimtAgtc=afinc,MiicuaIRefeBsc,uidAi»aigaiosnt P a g € l o f 9 , D e v e l o p e r s ^ 
M Y I : M j Mr. Young; 
Ms, Y o u u g ^ ^ M r . Seely: 
* * * 
7. Assignment To secure the obligations of Principal [MYI] and 
Indemnitor hereunder and any other indebtedness and liabilities of 
Principal or Indemnitor to Surety [Developers], Principal and Indemnitor 
hereby assign, transfer, pledge and convey to Surety, effective 
immediately upon and only in the event that there shall be an event of 
default hereunder, all rights in and to . ; . : 
7.1 Any and all contracts to subcontracts'let in connection 
therewith . . . , 
12 Any and all machinery, plant, equipment tools and materials which 
shall be upon the site or sites of the work or project... or elsewhere . . . . 
7,3 Any and all sums due or which may become due upon partial or full 
performance of the Obligation and all sums due or to become due on all 
other contracts, covenants and agreements whether bonded or unbonded, 
in which the Principal or Indemnitor has any interest together with any 
notes, accounts receivable or chose in action related thereto. 
* * * 
7.5 Any an all undisbursed loan funds, deposits or interest reserve 
accounts to which the Principal or Indemnitor may be entitled, and any 
and all collateral for any undertakings given by Principal, Indemnitor or 
any Guarantor in connection with any Obligation. 
(Emphasis in original). 
E. Claims were made against the Black Ridge Bond and the River Road Bond by MYI's 
unpaid subcontractors or suppliers. As a result, Developers was compelled to pay bond claimants a 
principal sum approximating $456,812.48 in satisfaction of said claims, and also incurred legal and 
other expenses. 
F. Developers sought recovery of these losses by commencing three lawsuits: 
1) Developers vs. Indemnitors. This suit, being case number 02-0502319 (hereinafter 
"Indemnity Litigation"), was brought in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington 
County, State of Utah against the Indemnitors seeking enforcement of the GIA. 
Developers obtained judgment against the Indemnitors, an injunction against the 
Indemnitors from disbursing funds or conveying any assets, and garnishments. 
The Order and Judgment specifically provides in the pertinent part as follows: 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that pursuant to URCP 64C and URCP 64D, Developers may 
execute, attach and garnish, in the amount of $540,668.61, the accounts 
receivable, assets, interests, money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real 
property, and personal property in which the Indemnitors have an interest, 
including bm not limited to, the following: 
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1. Merrick Young 
Stephanie Young 
3511 Paiute Road 
St George or Bloomington, Utah 84790-7741 
The above real property known as 3511 Paiute Road and 
any funds obtained from its sale, including all other assets 
of the Indemnitors. 
2. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, for the project known as Black Ridge Drive, 
250 West Improvement, Project SID 99-4, Inquiry No. 00-
• 1260. 
3. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, for the project known as River Road, Project 
No. STP-3196(1)0. 
4. Funds due and owing to. Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, from General Contractor, La Farge, N.A., for 
the project known as 1-15 Sevier River Northward Project, 
ProjectNo.: *IM-NH-15-5(31)200. 
5. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, from General Contractor, Meadow Valley 
Contractors, Inc., for the project known as UDOT 1-15 
North Interchange, 
ProjectNo.: IM-15-2-3861. 
6. Any equity in any other real property, business or asset in 
which any Indemnitor has an interest. 
7. Any money, stocks, bonds, or other assets of any 
Indemnitor. 
8. Any interest in Black Ridge Commercial Center, LLC; Black 
Ridge, LLC, or any other partnershipj limited partnership, limited 
liability company, sole proprietorship, corporation, or other 
business entity in which any Indemnitor has an interest, and any 
real property in which these entities have an interest. [All assets 
referenced in paragraphs 1 through 8 of the Court's Order are 
referred to in this Agreement as "Indemnitors5 Assets"]. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, 
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ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Indemnitors 
Merrick Young, individually; Stephanie Young, 
individually; and Meirick Young Inc. (collectively referred 
to as "Indemnitors") axe preliminarily enjoined as follows: 
1, Indemnitors axe enjoined, restrained and prevented from 
selling, transferring, disposing, distrihuting, pledging, or 
encumbering any corporate assets, limited liability 
company assets, partnership assets, real property, personal 
property or assets of any business entity in which 
Indemnitors possess an interest until further order of this 
Court except as described in paragraph 3 below. 
2. All corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships 
and/or any business entities in which Indemnitors possess 
any interest are hereby restrained, enjoined and prevented 
from selling, transferring, disposing, distributing, pledging, 
or encumbering any asset or real or personal property until 
further order of this Court. 
3. Merrick Young, individually; and Stephanie Young, 
individually; shall be allotted reasonable funds for 
reasonable daily living expenses, such as food, housing, 
gasoline for necessary travel, clothing, and utilities for the 
household, but are enjoined, absent approval of this Court, 
from the purchase or expenditure of funds to acquire any 
motorized vehicle, jewelry, stocks, bonds, vacations or 
other consumer items not necessary to sustain life and 
health. 
4. This Order is binding upon the parties to this action, their 
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and 
upon those persons in active concert or participation with 
them who receive notice, in person or through counsel, or 
otherwise, of this Order. 
2) Developers v. Utah Department of Transportation. This suit, being Civil Case No. 
030500102, was institated in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, State 
of Utah against UDOT for additional sums owed MYI based on UDOT's alleged breach 
of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, subrogation, 
and negligence with respect to the River Road project (hereinafter "UDOT Litigation"). 
3) Developers v. City of St. George. Developers instituted Civil Case No. 030500096 in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court Washington County, State of Utah against the City of St. 
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George for additional sums owed MYI based on the City of St George's alleged breach 
of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and subrogation 
with respect to the Black Ridge Drive Project (hereinafter "Developers Black Ridge 
Drive Project Litigation"). 
G. MYI v. the City of St George. MYI instituted Civil Case No. 030500101 in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah against the City of St George for additional 
amounts allegedly due and owing to MYI from the City of St George pertaining to the Black Ridge 
Drive Project, (hereinafter "MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation"). 
H. Seely is an individual interested in purchasing certain assets of MYI. Seely is not an 
indemnitor to Developers nor does Seely have any relationship to Developers. Seely's interest is in 
purchasing assets of Indemnitors owned by Developers or which are subject to the judgment, injunction, 
and garnishment 
I. Developers has paid out, for and on behalf of MYI, a principal amount of approximately 
$456,812.48, which amount has accrued interest at the rate of ten percent (10%), and has also expended 
attorneys' fees and costs. Developers asserts that Indemnitors are liable for all these expenses. 
Indemnitors assert that they are currently incapable of satisfying Developers in full. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED, for valuable 
consideration, as follows: 
1. Recitals. The foregoing recitals are true and correct and are incorporated herein. 
2. Payment of Settlement Funds and Consideration. Developers, and Indemnitors mutually 
wish to resolve the disputes and litigation between them and assign certain interests. In consideration of 
such resolution and assignments, Developers, Indemnitors, and Seely agree as follows: 
a) Indemnitors do hereby assign, transfer, and set over to Developers any and all interests, 
rights, and title that Indemnitors possess or may possess to the payment of any money regarding the 
Black Ridge Drive Project, including any and all interests, rights and title to die MYI Black Ridge Drive 
Project Litigation. Developers is specifically authorized by Indemnitors to prosecute, compromise, 
dismiss or otherwise dispose of the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation. Indemnitors have no 
further claim against the City regarding the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation as all those rights 
are assigned to Developers. 
b) Indemnitors confirm and aver that Indemnitors have assigned, transferred, and set oyer to 
Developers any and all interests, rights, and title that Indemnitors possess or may possess to 
Indemnitors' Assets. 
c) Concurrent with Developers' execution of this Agreement, Seely shall pay Developers a lump 
sum payment of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) in certified funds. 
d) In consideration of Seely's payment to Developers of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
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(5150,000.00) in certified funds, Developers (I) hereby assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely any and 
all interests, rights, and title that Developers possesses or may possess to the payment of any money 
regarding the UDOT Project, including any and all interests, rights and title to the UDOT Litigation ; 
and (ii) hereby assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely all Indemnitors' Assets "with the exception of 
the Black Ridge Drive Project, the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation, and Developers Black 
Ridge Drive Project Litigation. " 
e) In consideration of MYI's assignment set forth in paragraph 2a, and in consideration of 
Seely's lump sum payment of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) in certified funds to 
Developers, Developers shall assign' the Indemnity Litigation to Seely, and Seely shall upon execution 
of this Agreement immediately notify the court in the Indemnity Litigation of the assignment, 
substitute in as Plaintiff in the stead of Developers, and retain Seely's own counsel. If Seely fails to so 
notify the court in the Indemnity Litigation within 10 business days of the execution of this Agreement, 
then Developers is authorized to notify the court as appropriate that the Indemnity Litigation is resolved 
and should be dismissed. 
f) In consideration of Developers' promises herein, the Indemnitors promise to provide full and 
complete cooperation to Developers to assist Developers in the Developers Black Ridge Drive Project 
Litigation. Such full and complete cooperation requires Indemnitors to produce requested documents, 
provide complete information, promptly respond to telephone calls and correspondence, and thoroughly 
prepare for and attend any substantive settlement meetings, depositions or trial. Developers and 
Indemnitors stipulate and agree that the failure of the Indemnitors to reasonably cooperate will damage 
Developers in.the amount of $100,000, for which Developers" may sue Indemnitors under this 
Agreement The liquidated damage of $100,000 bears a reasonable relationship to Developers' 
anticipated loss and is agreed upon due to the difficulty in calculating an actual damage 
g) As stated in paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d), and as of the date of this Agreement, all of Indemnitors5 
assets and all interests therein (except those reserved to Developers), which have been or could be 
attached by Developers via the GIA or otherwise, are hereby conveyed to Developers and then to Seely. 
Developers retains no interest in any such assets. Further, Developers hereby releases Indemnitors from 
all obligations associated with the Black Ridge Drive Project and River Road Project except as stated 
herein. However, this Agreement shall in no way impair or affect the indemnity obligations which 
Indemnitors may have, if any, under the GIA as to any other bonded projects, if any. Developers may 
enforce the GIA as against any such other bonded projects, and attach any of Indemnitors' assets, as 
provided by the GIA, after the date of this Agreement The parties hereby represent that they are not 
aware of any such bonded projects, for which Indemnitors might have any obligations. 
h) Regarding the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation assigned by MYI to Developers and 
the Indemnity Litigation and the UDOT Litigation assigned by Developers to Seely, Developers and 
Seely mutually agree to notify the defendant(s) of the applicable assignment and to substitute the name 
of the assignee for the assignor within 30 days of this Agreement being executed by all parties. All 
parties to this Agreement agree to execute any document necessary to accomplish the assignments and 
substitutions so that this 30 day deadline is met. 
3. Mutual Releases, Consideration and Assignments, In exchange for the Payment of 
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Settlement Funds and Consideration described herein, Developers and Indemnitors agree to the 
following mutual releases: 
a. Developers. Developers and its parent(s), assignees, heirs, successors in interest, 
predecessors in interest, principals, and other related entities, hereby unconditionally waive, release, 
relinquish, acquit, and forever discharge (with the exception of warranty work) the Indemnitors, their 
respective heirs, assignees, successors in interest, parents, subsidiaries, and other related entities, of and 
from any and all rights, claims, demands, damages, debts, liens, claims for relief, actions, suits, causes 
of action, interest, damages, fees, costs, and the like, of every kind and nature whatsoever, known and 
unknown, suspected and unsuspected, anticipated and unanticipated, past, present and future, whether 
arising at law, under a contract, in tort, in equity, or otherwise, for all damages, losses, injuries, 
economic loss, attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, or otherwise, including without limitation all 
consequential, general, special, and/or punitive damages, resulting from, or to result from, or in any way 
arising out of or related to MYI's default or failure to pay KV Electric; Triple "B" Concrete; Western 
Rock'Products; Environmental Abatement, Inc.; Koch Performance Asphalt; KV Electric; Progressive 
Contracting; Progressive Contracting & AT Asphalt Paving; Contech Construction; Hikiau, Inc.; and 
K&J Traffic Control, and any and all other obligations under the GIA, except as reserved herein. 
Developers specifically reserves all rights and remedies against MYI and the Indemnitors regarding any 
performance, warranty, defect, personal injury, third party injury, real property, personal property or 
asbestos claim that may be asserted by the City, UDOT or any other entity against Developers regarding 
the Black Ridge Drive Project or the UDOT Project, and Developers is entitled to recovery attorneys' 
fees, costs and other expenses as set forth in the GIA in defending or resolving such claims. 
b. MYI and Indemnitors. In consideration of Developers' foregoing release and 
Developers' agreement to assign to Seely the Indemnity Litigation, Indemnitors, for themselves, and 
their heirs, assignees, and successors in interest, hereby unconditionally waive, release, relinquish, 
acquit, and forever discharge Developers and its heirs, assignees, parents, subsidiaries, successors in 
interest, and other related entities, of and from any and all rights, claims, demands, damages, debts, 
liens, claims for relief, actions, suits, causes of action, interest, damages, fees, costs, and the like, of 
every kind and nature whatsoever, known and unknown, suspected and unsuspected, anticipated and 
unanticipated, past, present and future, whether arising at law, under a contract, in tort, in equity, or 
otherwise, for all damages, losses, injuries, economic loss, attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, or otherwise, 
including without limitation all consequential, general, special, and/or punitive damages, resulting from, 
or to result from, or in any way connected to the Indemnity Agreement, or any bond. 
HI. General Terms. 
1-. Assignment of this Agreement Developers may freely assign and/or delegate, in whole 
or in part, its rights, interest, and remedies to this Agreement. Indemnitors shall not assign, however, any 
of MYI's accounts receivables, the proceeds therefrom, or any interest therein existing prior to the date of 
this Agreement. 
2. Headings. The headings in this Agreement axe for ready reference only and shall not be used 
to limit or expand the terms of this Agreement. 
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3. Verification of Authority. Each of the individuals signing this Agreement hereby confirms, 
individually and/or on behalf of the entity whom they represent, that they have foil legal power and 
authority to execute this Agreement on the entity's behalf and that the entity has full legal power and 
authority to perform this Agreement The consummation of all transactions contemplated herein have been 
duly authorized by all necessary entities, including the appropriate passing of resolutions and directions, 
and this Agreement constitutes legal, valid, and binding obligations of such Party, enforceable in accordance 
with its terms. 
4. Default and Attorneys Fees, The laws of the State of Utah govern this AGREEMENT and 
any party to this AGREEMENT who retains counsel to enforce the terms hereof shall be entitled to 
attorneys' fees incurred in said enforcement. Any action to enforce the terms of this Agreement shall be 
brought in the fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, Utah. 
5. Severability. If any provision of this AGREEMENT is determined to be invalid, said 
determination shall not affect the validity of the remainder of the AGREEMENT. 
6. Counterparts and copies. This AGREEMENT may be signed in counterpart, and copies 
or facsimile copies of signatures shall be considered to be originals. 
7. Withdrawal of Counsel and Waiver of Potential Conflict. In anticipation of this 
Agreement, Parties agree that Robert M. Jensen will be completely withdrawing as Counsel for Developers. 
Developers recognizes that from this point forward, Robert M. Jensen is not representing the interests of 
the Developers with respect to any lawsuit or in respect to the drafting of this Agreement. Further, 
Developers agrees and understands that Robert M. Jensen is directly opposed to Developers for purposes 
of negotiating this Agreement and for all business dealings and associations hereafter. Developers 
knowingly and voluntarily waives any and all conflicts of interest. 
8. Attorney Fees and Costs, If suit is commenced by any Party to enforce the terms of this 
Agreement, then the prevailing Party shall recover all attorneys' fees and costs incurred in such suit. 
DATED this day of January, 2004. 
Developers Surety and Indemnity Company 
Approved as to form and content: 
DATED this day of January, 2004, 
FAUX & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
By: 
its authorized representative 
Kurt C, Faux, Esq. 
2785 E. Desert Inn Road, Suite 270 
Las Vegas, NV 89121 
Attorney for Developers Surety and Indemnity 
Company 
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DATED this 2>5 "day of J&a&sy* 2004. 
Merrick Young, Incorporated 
By/ MefSJk Youn|i 
its President ijfiaWuthorized 
resentatixe^y 
« 
ATEDthis, day of Jantrary, 2004. 
Merrick^oung, indp&dllaliy 
DATED this«?,5 day of feuuarj, 2004. 
fMM 
Stephanie-Young" ind^du^ally/y 
DATED this-<7 day ofJonuaiy, 2004. 
lydeJ3. Seely, individually 
Approved as to form and content; 
DATED this day of January, 2004. 
JENKINS JENSEN & BAYLES, LLP 
Robert M. Jensen, Esq. 
1240 East 100 South, Suite 9 
St. George, UT 84790 
Attorney for Merrick Youngj Incorporated; and 
Merrick Young, individually 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 7 / 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAHY K^^-:-
MERJUCK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 
Utah corporation, and CLYDE G. SEELY, 
assignee and real party in interest, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, et al., 
Defendant. 
RULING ON CLYDE G. SEELY'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came before the Court on counterclaim defendant Clyde G. Seely's "Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim." The pleading that Mr. Seely seeks to have dismissed was 
filed by defendant Engineered Structures, Inc. ("ESI") on August 16,2007. Having fully considered 
the parties' memoranda and arguments, the documents provided for purposes of this Motion, and the 
record shown in the Court's eleven-volume file for this action, the Court rules that Mr. Seely's 
Motion to Dismiss should be denied. 
FACTS 
This action began with the filing of the original Complaint of plaintiff Merrick Young 
Incorporated ("MYI") on May 4,2001. After filing an Amended Complaint, MYI actively pursued 
its claims against several defendants. 
In connection with other business matters not related to the subject of this action, MYI and 
its two principals, as "Indemnitors," entered into an Indemnity Agreement with Developers Surety 
and Indemnity Company ("Developers"). The Indemnity Agreement included the Indemnitors' 
assignment to Developers, for security purposes, of all of their rights related to the other business 
matters, as well as uall sums due or to become due on all other contracts, covenants and agreements 
. . . in which the Principal or Indemnitor has any interest, together with any notes, accounts 
receivable or chose in action related thereto." 
When Developers was required to pay certain claims for which it was surety in those other 
business matters, Developers filed claims in this Court against MYI and its principals for 
indemnification. Developers obtained an Order and Judgment in that case allowing it to attach the 
assets of the Indemnitors (MYI and its principals), which included specific funds and claims as well 
as "[a]ny equity in any other ... asset in which any Indemnitor has an interest" and "[a]ny ... other 
assets of any Indemnitor." The Court's Order referred collectively to the several assets to be attached 
as "Indemnitors' Assets." Developers also filed actions in this Court against the Utah Department 
of Transportation and the City of St. George for sums it claimed were owed to MYI. 
On March 25,2004, MYI, its two principals, and Mr. Seely signed a "Settlement Agreement, 
Mutual Release, and Assignment" which was then signed by Developers on April 5, 2004. That 
Agreement recited that "Seely is an individual interested in purchasing certain assets of MYI." By 
that Agreement, (a) MYI and its principals transferred all of the "Indemnitors' Assets" to 
Developers, (b) Mr. Seely paid Developers $150,000.00, and (c) Developers transferred to Mr. Seely 
all of the "Indemnitors' Assets" as well as the rights to Developers' lawsuit against MYI and its two 
principals and its lawsuit against the Utah Department of Transportation. Mr. Seely was required 
to substitute for Developers as plaintiff in those lawsuits, in this Court, so that they would be 
prosecuted in his own name. The Agreement further provided that its interpretation would be 
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governed by Utah law and that venue of any action to enforce the Agreement would be in this Court. 
At the time of the "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment," this action by 
MYI was in active litigation in this Court. According to the evidence currently available to this 
Court, the facts appear to be as follows: The claims made in this case by MYI constituted a chose 
in action which was an asset of MYI. That chose in action was attached by Developers in its lawsuit 
against MYI and its principals, and it was transferred to Mr. Seely in accordance with the 
"Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" signed by Mr. Seely in 2004. This 
litigation continued thereafter, with MYI continuing to prosecute the case in its own name, in spite 
of the transfer of its assets to Developers and then to Mr. Seely. 
ANALYSIS 
Mr. Seely argues that this history is insufficient to give this Court jurisdiction over him. He 
describes the "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" in 2004 as a transaction in 
which he only paid the debts of MYI and its principals, one of which is his daughter. He asserts that 
he "could not have anticipated that this act of charity to his daughter would subject him to the 
jurisdiction of this Court." 
This argument does not correctly describe Mr. Seely's position and rights, however, under 
the "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment." Regardless of whether Mr. Seely 
covertly controlled the prosecution of this action after 2004 or he deliberately or negligently allowed 
MYI to continue to control it, Mr. Seely had the right to control MYI's claims in this case. The 
specification of certain lawsuits transferred to Mr. Seely in the "Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
Release, and Assignment" does not obviate the general language therein which also gave Mr. Seely 
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"[a]ny equity in any other... asset in which any Indemnitor has an interest" and "[a]ny... other assets 
of any Indemnitor." The chose in action upon which MYI sued the defendants in this case is one 
such asset, and Mr. Seely owns it. For these reasons, this Court has previously ruled that Mr. Seely, 
as the assignee and real party in interest, should be joined as a plaintiff. 
This does not mean that Mr. Seely steps into MYI's shoes for all purposes. ESI does not seek 
to subject Mr. Seely to its original counterclaims against MYI, but ESI does assert that it has claims 
against Mr. Seely which accrued after he acquired his rights to MYI's claims in 2004. Having 
acquired all of the assets of MYI and its principals during the pendency of this action by MYI, Mr. 
Seely could and should have anticipated that this would subject him to the jurisdiction of this Court 
for his acts and omissions as to his ownership of the chose in action in this case. Consequently, there 
is nothing unreasonable or unfair in requiring Mr. Seely to respond to ESI's claims, and this Court 
has jurisdiction sufficient to do so. 
Mr. Seely also argues that ESI's counterclaims against him have no merit, but that argument 
is adequately refuted by ESI's memorandum. Considering the ESI counterclaims against Mr. Seely 
in the light most favorable to ESI, it appears that ESI has stated claims upon which relief may be 
granted. 
Accordingly, Mr. Seely's Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim is denied. 
Dated this Jj£>_ day of April, 2008. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE ^ - « 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 10 day of Aff 2008,1 provided true and correct copies 
of the foregoing RULING to each of the attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy in the 
United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Dennis C. Farley 
Attorney for Plaintiff MYI 
299 South Main, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E. Scott Savage 
Attorney for Plaintiff MYI 
170 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clark B. Fetzer 
Attorney for Defendants 
3 Triad Center, Suite 175 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 9695 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Greggory J. Savage 
Attorney for Clyde G. Seely 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 





IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 
Utah corporation, and CLYDE G. SEELY, 
assignee and real party in interest, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, et al, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION FOR 
DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
This matter came again before the Court on the "Motion for Dismissal With Prejudice" which 
was filed, with supporting memorandum and attachments, on November 24, 2008 by defendants 
Engineered Structures, Inc. ("ESI"), Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust ("Wal-Mart55), and 
American Insurance Company ("AIC"). Plaintiff Clyde G. Seely joined in the Motion, which was 
signed by his counsel of record. Plaintiff Merrick Young Incorporated ("MYI") filed an opposing 
memorandum, and the moving defendants filed a reply memorandum and a Request to Submit for 
Decision. Although a hearing was requested, the Court finds that, so far as this Court is concerned, 
the issue has been authoritatively decided and denies the request for hearing. Having fully reviewed 
the matter, the Court grants the Motion. 
In a Ruling entered April 10, 2008, the Court concluded that Mr. Seely is the owner of the 
claims made by MYI in this case, so that it is proper for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over him. Since MYI does not appear to understand that Ruling completely, the Court will restate 
in greater detail its analysis of the "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" (the 
"Agreement") executed by Mr. Seeley, MYI and its two principals, and Developers Surety and 
Indemnity Company ("Developers") in March and April 2004. The critical elements of that 
Agreement are as follows: 
a. Developers, MYI and its two principals had previously entered into an Indemnity 
Agreement in which MYI and its two principals assigned to Developers, for security 
purposes, several property rights, including "all sums due or to become due on all. 
.. contracts, covenants and agreements... in which [MYI and its two principals] has 
[sic] any interest, together with any... chose in action related thereto." (Agreement, 
p. 2, reciting f 7 of the Indemnity Agreement.) 
b. In another action filed in this court, Developers obtained a judgment against MYI and 
its two principals which ordered that Developers could execute against "Any equity 
in any other . . . asset in which [MYI or its two principals] has any interest" as well 
as "Any . . . other assets of [MYI or its two principals]." (Agreement, p. 3.) 
c. The Agreement provided that "[MYI and its two principals] confirm and aver that 
[they] have assigned, transferred, and set over to Developers any and all interest, 
rights, and title that [MYI and its two principals] possess or may possess to [their] 
assets." (Agreement, p. 5, ^  2.b.) 
d. The Agreement further provided that Mr. Seely would pay Developers $ 150,000, for 
which Developers "hereby assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely all [MYFs and 
its two principals'] Assets," with exceptions which are not relevant to the instant 
case. (Agreement, pp. 5-6, If 2.d.) 
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e. This case was commenced by the Complaint filed by MYI on May 4, 2001, nearly 
three years before the Agreement was executed by MYI, so the claims made by MYI 
in this case constituted a chose in action—a right to make a claim in a 
lawsuit—which, regardless of its value or the likelihood of its success, constituted 
an asset of MYI which MYI transferred to Developers, and Developers transferred 
to Mr. Seely, in 2004. 
f. Accordingly, Mr. Seely now has the right to pursue the claims filed by MYI in this 
case or to settle them. 
MYI suggests that the Court reconsider its Ruling regarding Mr. Seely's rights to the claims 
filed by MYI, and proposes to give evidence that MYI and Mr. Seely did not intend a transfer of 
MYI's claims from MYI to Developers to Mr. Seely. MYI identifies no ambiguity in the Agreement, 
however, and the Court finds none. The intent of the parties to the Agreement is clearly expressed 
in the written terms of the Agreement and an objective reading of the Agreement leads to the Court's 
conclusions. Consideration of extrinsic evidence to prove a different intent would not be consistent 
with rules of construction or rules of evidence. 
MYI's other arguments are equally unavailing. Vague concepts of equity are not sufficient 
to rob the parties to a contract of the benefits of their bargain, and the Court is not free to give MYI 
a better contract than the Agreement it made for itself. Mr. Seely's interest or lack of interest in the 
MYI claims has nothing to do with his ownership of those claims. Finally, MYI's misfortune—in 
pursuing claims it did not own—is not a basis for ignoring clear legal principles. 
Consequently, the Motion for Dismissal With Prejudice is granted, and the claims made in 
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the First, Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action as set forth in the Amended Complaint will be 
dismissed with prejudice. The Order proposed by the moving parties, which includes additional 
terms consistent with the October 2008 "Settlement Agreement" among Mr. Seely and the moving 
defendants, will be executed and entered with this Ruling. 
Dated this \ day of January, 2009. 
G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this <JPI day of \ T^~ _, 2009,1 provided true and correct 
copies of the foregoing ORDER to each of the attorneys/parties named below by placing a copy 
in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Jon M. Lear 
Dennis C. Farley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff MYI 
808 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
E. Scott Savage 
Attorney for Plaintiff MYI 
170 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clark B. Fetzer 
Attorney for Defendants 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kim J. Trout 
Attorney for Defendants 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Greggory J. Savage 
Attorney for Plaintiff Seely 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
*{***+ MJUu 
DEPUTY CLERK OF CO 
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SAVAGE, YEATES & WALDRON, P.C. 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Stephen R. Waldron (6810) 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)328-2200 
Fax:(801)531-9926 
LEAR & LEAR 
Jon Lear (1913) 
The Downey Mansion 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 538-5000 
Fax: (801) 538-5001 
Attorneys for Merrick Young Incorporated 
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m THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK 
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, and DOES 1-100, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 010500909 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
BASED UPON THE MOTION SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANTS ENGINEERED 
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STRUCTURES, INC., THE WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST AND THE 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY AND THE NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION BY 
PLAINTIFF CLYDE G. SEELY, AND GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The First Cause of Action as set forth in the Amended Complaint (Breach of 
Contract: Defendant ESI), is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice; 
2. The Second Cause of Action as set forth in the Amended Complaint 
(Mechanic's Lien/Foreclosure: Wal-Mart), is hereby DISMISSED, with 
prejudice; 
3. The Third Cause of Action as set forth in the Amended Complaint (Bond 
Claim: Defendant ESI), is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice; 
4. The Fourth Cause of Action as set forth in the Amended Complaint (Unjust 
Enrichment), is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice; 
5. ESFs and AIC's Sixth Claim for Relief as set forth in the Second Amended 
Counterclaim, Abuse of Process against Clyde G. Seeley, is hereby 
DISMISSED, with prejudice; 
6. ESFs Seventh Claim for Relief as set forth in its Second Amended 
Counterclaim, Attorney Fees/Breach of Contract against Clyde G. Seely, is 
hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice; 
7. ESFs Eighth Claim for Relief as set forth in its Second Amended 
Counterclaim, Attorney Fees/Lien Foreclosure against Clyde G. Seely, is hereby 
DISMISSED, with prejudice; 
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8. ESI's and AIC's Ninth Claim for Relief as set forth in the Second Amended 
Counterclaim, Attorney Fees/Private Payment Bond against Clyde G. Seely, is 
hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice; 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly 
determines that there is no just reason for delay of an appeal of this Order, and expressly directs 
entry of a final judgment in favor of defendants as to plaintiff Merrick Young Incorporated5 s 
claims for relief in the Amended Complaint against defendants that are dismissed hereunder. 
DATED this _ 0 r day of April, 2009. 
HONORABLE G. RAND BEACHAM 
Fifth Judicial District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing proposed 
AMENDED ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
this day of April, 2009, to the following: 
Clark B. Fetzer 
Rinehart Fetzer Simonsen & Booth, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Kim Trout 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Greggory J. Savage 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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Michael W. Spence (4674) 
Greggory J. Savage (5988) 
Angelina Tsu (9958) 
RAY QUTNNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, 14th Floor 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Clyde Seely 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 




WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 




Case No. 010500909 
Judge: G. Rand Beacham 
DECLARATION OF CLYDE G. SEELY 
I, Clyde G. Seely, declare and state as follows: 
1. I am over eighteen years of age and have personal knowledge of the contents of 
this Declaration. This Declaration is submitted in support of a motion to dismiss me as a party in 
the above-captioned litigation. 
2. I am a life long resident of the state of Montana. For the past 42 years, my 
exclusive residence has been in West Yellowstone, Montana where I am involved in the lodging 
business. 
3. I am the father-in-law of Merrick Young who I understand was or is a minority 
shareholder of Merrick Young Inc. ("MYI"), the plaintiff in the above-captioned action. 
4. Starting in approximately 2003, Merrick Young experienced financial difficulties 
which created difficult circumstances for my daughter and him. In an effort to assist my 
daughter and her husband, I agreed to pay off certain of their personal obligations in order to 
allow them to avoid personal bankruptcy. In connection with paying some of these debts, 
Merrick Young had his counsel prepare the Settlement, Mutual Release, and Assignment 
("Settlement Agreement") attached hereto as Exhibit 1. I was not represented by independent 
legal counsel with respect to the Settlement Agreement. Robert Jensen negotiated and drafted 
the Settlement Agreement on behalf Merrick Young. I assumed this Settlement Agreement 
would represent the best interest of both Merrick Young and me so I did not retain independent 
counsel. Robert Jensen answered all of my questions regarding the Settlement Agreement prior 
my executing it. I did not participate in preparing the Settlement Agreement. I am not sure 
where I signed the Settlement Agreement, but my best recollection at this time is that I signed the 
document in Montana. 
5. At the time I signed the Settlement Agreement, I was generally aware of a dispute 
between MYI, Wal-Mart and others. I did not understand that the Settlement Agreement gave 
me any right or interest with respect to the above-captioned litigation nor did I expect to receive 
any such right or interest. The first time I learned that anyone was asserting that I had any right 
or interest with respect to the litigation was when the defendants sought to join me as a party in 
this litigation. I have not at any time, nor do I now, claim any right or interest in or with respect 
to the above-captioned litigation. I have not at any time directed, funded or otherwise pursued 
the litigation. 
6. I do not regularly transact business in the State of Utah. My own regular business 
involvement with the State of Utah is that I annually have an exhibit at the Utah State Fair 
relating to the lodging businesses that I run in West Yellowstone, Montana. I do not maintain a 
bank account in the State of Utah. 
I declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct. 
2 
Executed on Septemberc/^ . 2007. 
Exhibit 
1 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, MUTUAL RELEASE, AND ASSIGNMENT 
This Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release and Assignment (hereinafter ''Agreement") is made on 
this day of , 2004, by and between Developers Surety and Indemnity Company 
Thereinafter "Developers™!: and Merrick Young Incorporated Thereinafter "MYI"V a Utah corporation; 
Merrick Young, an individual (hereinafter"Mr. Young"); Stephanie Young, an individual (hereinafter "Ms. 
Young"); and Clyde G. Seely, an individual (hereinafter "Seely"). All entities referenced above are 
collectively referred to as the "Parties". 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS: 
A. Developers issued Labor and Material Payment Bond and Performance Bond No. 870694P 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Black Ridge Bond"), with City of St. George, as obligee, and MYI, as 
principal, for the project known as Black Ridge Drive, 250 West Improvement, Project SID 99-4, Inquiry 
No. 00-1260 (hereinafter the "Black Ridge.Project"). The amount, or penal sum, of the bond was 
$1,543,000.00. &Ut^ 
B. Developers issued Payment Bond and Performance Bond No. 870960P (hereinafter 
referred to as the "River Road Bond"), with the State of Utah by and through the Utah Department of 
Transportation, as obligee, and MYI, as principal, for me project known as River Road, Project No. 
STP-3196(1)0 (hereinafter the "River Road Project*). The penal sum of the bond was $ 1,229,229.00. 
C. Developers Insurance Company merged into Developers, and Developers assumed all 
assets, rights, liabilities and obligations of Developers Insurance Company. 
D. MYI, Mr. Young, and Ms. Young (collectively referred to as "Indemnitors") entered into 
an Indemnity Agreement, GIA. No. 75605-01, (hereinafter "GIA") with Developers wherein Indemnitors 
agreed, among other things, to fully defend and indemnify Developers from and against any and all loss 
incurred as a consequence of issuing any bonds in favor of MYI and to assign to Developers accounts 
receivable and contracts. The pertinent portions of these promises are set forth in paragraphs 1 and 7 of 
the GIA, as follows; 
1. INDEMNIFICATION. In consideration of the execution and 
delivery by Surety of a Bond or any Bonds on behalf of Principal, 
Principal and Indemnitor shall pay all premiums charged by Surety in 
connection with any Bond (including extensions, renewals or 
modifications) issued by Surety on behalf of Principal and shall indemnify 
and hold Surety harmless from and against any and all liability, loss, 
claims, demands, costs, damages, attorneys' fees and expenses of 
whatever kind or nature, together with interest thereon at the maximum 
rate allowed by law, which Surety may sustain or 
incur by reason of or in consequence of the execution and delivery by 
Surety of any Bond on behalf of Principal, whether or not Surety shall 
have paid any amount on account thereof,.... 
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* * * 
7. A s s i g n m e n t To secure die obligations o f Principal [MYI] and 
Indemnitor hereunder and any other indebtedness and liabilities of 
Principal or Indemnitor to Surety [Developers], Principal and Indemnitor 
hereby assign, ff&Mfer, plfcdga *tid fefrw^y to Surety, rtfefettvc 
immediately upon and on ly in the event that there shall be an event o f 
default hereunder, all rights in and to . . . : 
7.1 Any and all contracts to subcontracts let in connection 
t h e r e w i t h . . , , 
7.2 Any and all machinery, plant, equipment tools and materials which 
shall be upon the site or sites of the work or p r o j e c t . . . or elsewhere — 
13 Any and all sums due or which may become due upon partial or full 
performance o f the Obligation and all sums due or to become due on all 
other contracts, covenants and agreements whether bonded or unbonded, 
in which the Principal or Indemnitor has any interest, together with any 
notes, accounts receivable or chose in action related thereto. 
* * * 
7.5 Any an all undisbursed loan funds, deposits or interest reserve 
accounts to which the Principal or Indemnitor may be entitled, and any 
and all collateral for any undertakings g iven by Principal, Indemnitor or 
any Guarantor in connect ion with any Obligation. 
(Emphasis in original). 
E. Claims were made against the Black Ridge Bond and the River Road B o n d by MYI's 
unpaid subcontractors or suppliers. A s a result, Developers was compel led to pay bond claimants a 
principal sum approximating $ 4 5 6 , 8 1 2 . 4 8 in satisfaction o f said claims, and also incurred legal and 
other expenses. 
F. Developers sought recovery of these losses by commenc ing three lawsuits: 
1) Developers vs . Indemnitors. This suit, being case number 02-0502319 (hereinafter 
"Indemnity Litigation"), w a s brought in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington 
County, Slate o f Utah against the Indemnitors seeking enforcement o f the GIA. 
Developers obtained judgment against the Indemnitors, an injunction against the 
Indemnitors from disbursing funds or conveying any assets, and garnishments. 
The Order and. Judgment specifically provides in the pertinent part as follows: 
IT IS F U R T H E R H E R E B Y ORDERED, A D J U D G E D A N D 
DECREED that pursuant to URCP 64C and U R C P 6 4 D , Developers may 
execute, attach and garnish, in the amount of $ 5 4 0 , 6 6 8 . 6 1 , the accounts 
receivable, assets, interests, money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real 
property, and personal property in which the Indemnitors have an interest, 
including but not limited to, the following: 
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1. Merrick Young 
Stephanie Young 
3511 Paiute Road 
St. George or Bloomington, Utah 84790-7741 
The above real property known as 3511 Paiute Road and 
any ilmik ubLained fium its sale, intituling all oilier assets 
of the Indemnitors. 
2. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, for the project known as Black Ridge Drive, 
250 West Improvement, Project SID 99-4, Inquiry No. 00-
1260. 
3. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, for the project known as River Road, Project 
No.STP-3l96(l)0. 
4. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, from General Contractor, La Farge, N.A., for 
the project known as M 5 Sevier River Northward Project, 
Project No.: *IM-NH-15-5(31)200. 
5. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or 
collectively, from General Contractor, Meadow Valley 
Contractors, Inc., for the project known as UDOT I-15 
North Interchange, 
Project No.: IM-1S-2-3861. 
6. Anyequity in any other real property, business or asset in 
which any Indemnitor has an interest. 
7. Any money, stocks, bonds, or other assets of any 
Indemnitor. 
8. Any interest in Black Ridge Commercial Center, LLC; Black 
Ridge, LLC, or any other partnership, limited partnership, limited 
liability company, sole proprietorship, cocporation, or other 
business entity in which any Indemnitor has an interest, and any 
real property in which these entities have an interest. [All assets 
referenced in paragraphs 1 tiirongh 8 of the Court's Order are 
referred to in this Agreement as "Indemnitors' Assets"]. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, 
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ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Indemnitors 
Merrick Young, individually; Stephanie Young, 
individually; and Merrick Young Inc. (collectively referred 
to as "Indemnitors") are preliminarily enjoined as follows: 
h Indemnitors a n mjuiued, temahied and pieveriled fium 
selling, transferring, disposing, distributing, pledging, or 
encumbering any corporate assets, limited liability 
company assets, partnership assets, real property, personal 
property or assets of any business entity in which 
Indemnitors possess an interest until further order of this 
Court except as described in paragraph 3 below. 
2. All corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships 
and/or any business entities in which Indemnitors possess 
any interest arc hereby restrained, enjoined and prevented 
from selling, transferring, disposing, distributing, pledging, 
or encumbering any asset or real or personal property until 
further order of this Court. 
3. Merrick Young, individually; and Stephanie Young, 
individually; shall be allotted reasonable funds for 
reasonable daily living expenses, such as food, housing, 
gasoline for necessary travel, clothing, and utilities for the 
household, but are enjoined, absent approval of this Court, 
from the purchase or expenditure of ftmds to acquire any 
motorized vehicle, jewelry, stocks, bonds, vacations or 
other consumer items not necessary to sustain life and 
health. 
4. This Order is binding upon the parties to this action, their 
officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and 
upon those persons in active concert or participation with 
them who receive notice, in person or through counsel, or 
otherwise, of this Order. 
2^ Developers v. Utah Department of Transportation. This suit, being Civil Case No. 
030500102, was instituted in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, State 
of Utah against UDOT for additional sums owed MYI based on UDOT's alleged breach 
of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, subrogation, 
and negligence with respect to the River Road project (hereinafter "UDOT Litigation"). 
3^ Developers v. Citv of St. George. Developers instituted Civil Case No. 030500096 in 
the Fifth Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah against the City of ^. / 
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George for additional sums owed MYI based on the City of St. George's alleged breach 
of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and subrogation 
with respect to the Black Ridge Drive Project (hereinafter "Developers Black Ridge 
Drive Project Litigation"). 
MYI v, the Citv of St George MYI instituted Civil Cass No. Q3QS001Q1 in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Washington County, State of Utah against the City of St. George for additional 
amounts allegedly due and owing, to MYI from the City of St. George pertaining to the Black Ridge 
Drive Project, (hereinafter MMY1 Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation"). 
H. Seely is an individual interested in purchasing certain assets of MYL Seely is not an 
indemnitor to Developers nor does Seely have any relationship to Developers. Seely's interest is in 
purchasing assets of Indemnitors owned by Developers or which arc subject to the judgment, injunction, 
and" garnishment. 
I. Developers has paid out, for and on behalf of MYI, a principal amount of approximately 
$456,812.48, which amount has accrued interest at the rate often percent (10%), and has also expended 
attorneys' fees and costs. Developers asserts that Indemnitors are liable for all these expenses. 
Indemnitors assert that they are currently incapable of satisfying Developers in full. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED, for valuable 
consideration, as follows: 
1, Recitals, The foregoing recitals are true and correct and are incorporated herein. 
2. Payment of Settlement Funds and Consideration. Developers, and Indemnitors mutually 
wish to resolve the disputes and litigation between them and assign certain interests. In consideration of 
such resolution and assignments, Developers, Indemnitors, and Seely agree as follows: 
a) Indemnitors do hereby assign, transfer, and set over to Developers any and all interests, 
rights, and title that Indemnitors possess or may possess to the payment of any money regarding the 
Black Ridge Drive Project, including any and ail interests, rights and title to the MYI Black Ridge Drive 
Project Litigation. Developers is specifically authorized by Indemnitors to prosecute, compromise, 
dismiss or otherwise dispose of the MYI Black Ridge Drive'Project Litigation. Indemnitors have no 
further claim against the City regarding the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation as all those rights 
are assigned to Developers. 
b) Indemnitors confirm and aver that Indemnitors have assigned, transferred, and set over to 
Developers any and all interests, rights, and title that Indemnitors possess or may possess to 
Indemnitors' Assets. 
c) Concurrent with Developers' execution of this Agreement, Seely shall pay Developers a lump 
sum payment of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) in certified funds. 
d) In consideration of Seely's payment to Developers of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars^ . / 
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($150,000.00) in certified funds, Developers (I) hereby assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely any and 
all interests, rights, and title that Developers possesses or may possess to the payment of any money 
regarding the UDOT Project, including any and all interests, rights and title to the UDOT Litigation; 
and (ii) hereby assigns, transfers, and sets over to Seely all Indemnitors' Assets with the exception of 
the Black Ridge Drive Project, the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation, and Developers Black 
Ridge Drive Project Litigation. 
e) In consideration of MYl's assignment set forth in paragraph 2a, and in consideration of 
Seely's lump sum payment of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) in certified funds to 
Developers, Developers shall assign the Indemnity Litigation to Seely, and Seely shall upon execution 
of this Agreement immediately notify the court in the Indemnity Litigation of die assignment, 
substitute in as Plaintiff in the stead of Developers, and retain Seely's own counsel. If Seely fails to so 
notify the court in the Indemnity Litigation within 10 business days of the execution of this Agreement, 
then Developers is authorized to notify the court as appropriate that the Indemnity Litigation is resolved 
and should be dismissed. 
f) In consideration of Developers1 promises herein, the indemnitors promise to provide full and 
complete cooperation to Developers to assist Developers in the Developers Black Ridge Drive Project 
Litigation. Such full and complete cooperation requires Indemnitors to produce requested documents, 
provide complete information, promptly respond to telephone calls and correspondence, and thoroughly 
prepare for and attend any substantive settlement meetings, depositions or trial. Developers and 
Indemnitors stipulate.and agree that the failure of the Indemnitors to reasonably cooperate will damage 
Developers in the amount of $100,000, for which Developers may sue Indemnitors under this 
Agreement. The liquidated damage of $t 00,000 bears a reasonable relationship to Developers' 
anticipated loss and is agreed upon due to the difficulty in calculating an actual damage 
g) As stated in paragraphs 2(b) and 2(d), and as of the date of this Agreement, all of Indemnitors' 
assets and all interests therein (except those reserved to Developers), which have been or could be 
attached by Developers via the GIA or otherwise, are hereby conveyed to Developers and then to Seeiy. 
Developers retains no interest in any such assets. Further, Developers hereby releases Indemnitors from 
all obligations associated with the Black Ridge Drive Project and River Road Project except as stated 
herein. However, this Agreement shall in no way impair or affect the indemnity obligations which 
Indemnitors may have, if any, under the GIA as to any other bonded projects, if any. Developers may 
enforce the GIA as against any such other bonded projects, and attach any of Indemnitors* assets, as 
provided by the GIA, after the date of this Agreement The parties hereby represent that they are not 
aware of any such bonded projects, for which Indemnitors might have any obligations. 
h) Regarding the MYI Black Ridge Drive Project Litigation assigned by MYI to Developers and 
die Indemnity Litigation and the UDOT Litigation assigned by Developers to Seely, Developers and 
Seely mutually agree to notify the defendants) of the applicable assignment and to substitute the name 
of the assignee for the assignor within 30 days of this Agreement being executed by all parties. All 
parties to this Agreement agree to execute any document necessary to accomplish the assignments and 
substitutions so that this 30 day deadline is met. 
3. Mutual Releases, Consideration and Assignments. In exchange for the Payment of / 
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Settlement Funds and Consideration described herein, Developers and Indemnitors agree to the 
following mutual releases: 
a. Developers. Developers and its parent(s), assignees, heirs, successors in interest, 
predecessors in interest, principals, and other related entities, hereby unconditionally waive, release, 
relinquish, acquit, and forever discharge (with the exception of warranty work) the Indemnitors, their 
respective heirs, assignees, successors in interest, parents, suDsidianes, and Othel related entities, uf and— 
from any and all rights, claims, demands, damages, debts, liens, claims for relief, actions, suits, causes 
of action, interest, damages, fees, costs, and the like, of every kind and nature whatsoever, known and 
unknown, suspected and unsuspected, anticipated and unanticipated, past, present and future, whether 
arising at law, under a contract, in tort, in equity, or otherwise, for all damages, losses, injuries, 
economic loss, attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, or otherwise, including without limitation all 
consequential, general, special, and/or punitive damages, resulting from, or to result from, or in any way 
arising out of or related to MYI's default or failure to pay K.V Electric; Triple "B* Concrete; Western 
Rock Products; Environmental Abatement, Inc.; Koch Performance Asphalt; KV Electric; Progressive 
Contracting; Progressive Contracting & AT Asphalt Paving; Contech Construction; Hikiau, Inc.; and 
K&J Traffic Control, and any and all other obligations under the GIA, except as reserved herein. 
Developers specifically reserves all rights and remedies against MYI and the Indemnitors regarding any 
performance, warranty, defect, personal injury, third party injury, real property, personal property or 
asbestos claim that may be asserted by the City, UDOT or any other entity against Developers regarding 
the Black Ridge Drive Project or the UDOT Project, and Developers is entitled to recovery attorneys' 
fees, costs and other expenses as set forth in the GIA in defending or resolving such claims. 
b. MYI and Indemnitors. In consideration of Developers* foregoing release and 
Developers' agreement to assign to Seely the Indemnity Litigation, Indemnitors, for themselves, and 
their heirs, assignees, and successors in interest, hereby unconditionally waive, release, relinquish, 
acquit, and forever discharge Developers and its heirs, assignees, parents, subsidiaries, successors in 
interest, and other related entities, of and from any and all rights, claims, demands, damages, debts, 
liens, claims for relief, actions, suits, causes of action, interest, damages, fees, costs, and the like, of 
every kind and nature whatsoever, known and unknown, suspected and unsuspected, anticipated and 
unanticipated, past, present and future, whether arising at law, under a contract, in tort, in equity, or 
otherwise, for all damages, losses, injuries, economic loss, attorneys' fees, costs, expenses, or otherwise, 
including without limitation all consequential, general, special, and/or punitive damages, resulting from, 
or to result from, or in any way connected to the Indemnity Agreement, or any bond. 
III. General Terms. 
1. Assignment of this Agreement Developers may freely assign and/or delegate, in whole 
or in part, its rights, interest, and remedies to this Agreement Indemnitors shall not assign, however, any 
of M YI's accounts receivables, the proceeds therefrom, or any interest therein existing prior to the date of 
this Agreement. 
2. Headings. The headings in this Agreement are for ready reference only and shall not be used 
to limit or expand the terms of this Agreement. 
SeRkmcnl Agreement, Motual iUletse, sad AMignncoi Page 7 of 9 Developers 
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3. Verification of Authority. Each of the individuals signing this Agreement hereby confirms, 
individually and/or on behalf of the entity whom they represent, that they have full legal power and 
authority to execute this Agreement on the entity's behalf and that the entity has fiill legal power and 
authority to perform this Agreement. The consummation of all transactions contemplated herein have been 
duly authorized by all necessary entities, Including the appropriate passing of resolutions and directions, 
<uid Ihis Agreement eonstitatoa legal, valid, and binding obligations of ruch Party, mfnrr/ahlft in aonorirfancg 
with its terms. 
4. Default and Attorneys Fees. The laws of the State of Utah govern this AGREEMENT and 
any party to this AGREEMENT who retains counsel to enforce the terras hereof shall be entitled to 
attorneys' fees incurred in said enforcement. Any action to enforce the terms of this Agreement shall be 
brought in the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Washington County, Utah. 
5. Severability. If any provision of this AGREEMENT is determined to be invalid, said 
determination shall not affect the validity of the remainder of the AGREEMENT. 
6. Counterparts and copies. This AGREEMENT may be signed in counterpart, and copies 
or facsimile copies of signatures shall be cansidfcred to be originals. 
7. Withdrawal of Counsel and Waiver of Potential Conflict. In anticipation of this 
Agreement, Parties agree that Robert M. Jensen will be completely withdrawing as Counsel for Developers. 
Developers recognizes that from this point forward, Robert M. Jensen is not representing the interests of 
the Developers with respect to any lawsuit or in respect to the drafting of this Agreement, Further, 
Developers agrees and understands that Robert M. Jensen is directly opposed to Developers for purposes 
of negotiating this Agreement and for all business dealings and associations hereafter. Developers 
knowingly and voluntarily waives any and all conflicts of interest. 
8. Attorney Fees and Costs. If suit is commenced by any Party to enforce the terms of this 
Agreement, then the prevailing Party shall recover all attorneys' fees and costs incurred in such suit. 
*ftj- (tfrUU* 
DATED this 5 day of January, 2004. Approved as to form and content: 
Developers Surety and Indemnity Company 
DATED this day of January, 2004. 
FAUX & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
^^m/^^r^^ By: ' (/ Kurt C. Faux, Esq. 
its authorized representative 2785 E. Desert inn Road, Suite 270 
Las Vegas, NV 89121 
Attorney for Developers Surety and Indemnity 
Company 
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M Y H ^ / ; Mr. Youmflteff 
Ms. YoungffiVfMr. Seely: 
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DATED this 7& day of Jamaa ,^ 2004. 
Approved as to form and content: 
DATED this^L day of Jaauwy, 2004. 
— '"UitL* 
Merrick Young, Incorporated 
cQATED this. , day of ternary, 2004. 
fyferrick Yo6ng, indpidTIally 
DATED thisc^S day of January, 2004. O 
hthJMm 
ung, indjyidually// Stephanie Young, 
DATED this-<2_ <&y oMrattftry, 2004. 
Clyde 0. Sccly, individually 
JENKINS JENSEN & BAYLES, LLP 
Robert KL Jensen, Esq. 
1240 East 100 South, Suite 9 
St. George, UT 84790 
Attorney for Merrick Young, Incorporated; and 
Merrick Young, individually 
Page 9 of 9 Developers: QrfL/ 
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Michael W. Spence (4674) 
Greggory J. Savage (5988) 
Michael D. Mayfield (8237) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Xlh-
Attorneys for Involuntary Plaintiff Clyde G. Seely 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 




N^WTiR iU SbCOND AMI.NDi 
COUNTERCLAIM 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and 
DOES 1-100, 
Defendants 
Case No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
Involuntary Plaintiff Clyde G. Seely ("Seely"), by and through his counsel, submits this 
aiv .*
 t- liiiiM^cu .VJ . tares, Inc. 
and The American Insurance Company (the "Counterclaim"). 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Counterclaim and each and every claim for relief therein fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Answering the numbered paragraphs of the Counterclaim, Seely answers and alleges as 
follows: 
1. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 1 and therefore 
denies the same. 
2. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 2 and therefore 
denies the same. 
3. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 3 and therefore 
denies the same. 
4. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 4 and therefore 
denies the same. 
5. Seely admits the allegations of paragraph 5. 
6. Paragraph 6 states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. All factual 
allegations are denied. Seely specifically denies that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 
him. 
7. Paragraph 7 states a legal conclusion to which no response is required. All factual 
allegations are denied. 
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8. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 8 and therefore 
denies the same. 
9. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 9 and therefore 
denies the same. 
10 Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 10 and therefore 
denies the same, 
11. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 11 and therefore 
di • i«> ;.. - . i f 
12. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 12 and tlieiefoie 
denies the same. 
13. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the aiieL..:*» -^ ! -\ir.i,.' •:•••• 
denies the same. 
14. Seely lacks k*i.« * u,h • * . i .. • . ••- , KCL ..• * . \--b -., . - ; : • •• fore 
denies the same. 
15. Seely lacks knowledge regard:! ng the allegations of paragraph 15 and therefore 
denies the same. 
16. Seely lacks knowledge regai ding the allegations of paragraph 16 and therefore 
denies the same. 
17. Seel) lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 17 and therefore 
denies the same. 
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18. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 18 speaks for itself. 
Seely lacks knowledge regarding the remaining allegations of paragraph 18 and therefore denies 
the same. 
19. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 19 speaks for itself. 
Seely lacks knowledge regarding the remaining allegations of paragraph 19 and therefore denies 
the same. 
20. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 20 and therefore 
denies the same. 
21. Seely admits that the documents referenced in paragraph 21 speaks for 
themselves. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the remaining allegations of paragraph 21 and 
therefore denies the same. 
22. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 22 and therefore 
denies the same. 
23. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 23. 
24. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 24 speaks for itself and 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 24. 
25. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 25 speaks for itself and 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 25. 
26. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 26 and therefore 
denies the same. 
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" -c i} lacks knowledge regarding the allegations o f paragraph 27 and therefore 
denies the same. 
28. See ly lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 28 and therefore 
denies the same. 
29. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 29 and therefore 
denies the same. 
30. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 30 and therefore 
denies the same, 
3 1 . See ly lacks knowledge regarding the a l legat ions of paragraph 31 and therefore 
denies the same. 
32. Seely lacks knowledge rega rding the allegations :>f paragraph 32 and therefore 
denies the same. 
33 . Seel ) lacks kn"u l ed | j e rcgaui ing llu j l l ega i ions of paragraph 33 and therefore 
denies the same. 
34. Seel) lacks know ledge regard ing the a l legat ions of paragraph 34 and therefore 
denies the same. 
35. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 35. 
36. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 36. 
37. Seely incorporates and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
38. Seely lacks knowledge regardr •. • iia; .'-is of paragraph :»K mn\ therefore 
denies the same. 
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39. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 39 and therefore 
denies the same. 
40. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 40 and therefore 
denies the same. 
41. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 41 and therefore 
denies the same. 
42. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 42 and therefore 
denies the same. 
43. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 43 speaks for itself and 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 43. 
44. Seely incorporates and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
45. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 45 speaks for itself and 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 45. 
46. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 46 and therefore 
denies the same. 
47. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 47 and therefore 
denies the same. 
48. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 48 and therefore 
denies the same. 
49. Seely incorporates and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
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50 Seely admits that the document referenced in paragraph 50 speaks for itself and 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 50. 
51 Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 51 speaks for itself and 
otl .-ir\vis(s Jt p « •.. :MrLK:iu-!r- ••! paragraph M. 
52. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 52 speaks for itself and 
otherv* i* -- v. • - i.» L^  -I- • •• ^ . ,
 r.i.:;-f- '2. 
53. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 53 and therefore 
uc-.ics ihe same, 
54. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 54 and affirmatively states that he does 
not claim any right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
55. Seely denies the allegar
 tMiai:;:jr-: : . 
5 6. S eely denies the allegations of paragraph 5 6. 
57. Seely admits that the Coi interclaims seeks tl le stated i elief but denies that it is 
appropriate and otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 57, 
58. Seel) incorporates and i e-assei ts h is responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
59. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 59 speaks for itself and 
nthtTwise denies lite alk'^aluur ot paragraph >9. 
60. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 60 and therefore 
den ies the same, 
61. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 61 and ?/ 'tv<*. :^ ' v-**; 
not claim any right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
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62. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 62 and affirmatively states that he does 
not claim any right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
63. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 63. 
64. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 64. 
65. Seely admits that the Counterclaims seeks the stated relief but denies that it is 
appropriate and otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 65. 
66. Seely incorporates and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
67. Seely admits that the agreement referenced in paragraph 67 speaks for itself and 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 67. 
68. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 68 and therefore 
denies the same. 
69. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 62 and affirmatively states that he does 
not claim any right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
70. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 70. 
71. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 71. 
72. Seely admits that the Counterclaims seeks the stated relief but denies that it is 
appropriate and otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 72. 
73. Seely incorporates and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
74. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 74. 
75. Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 75. 
76. Seely denies the allegations paragraph 76. 
8 
Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 77 and therefore 
denies the same. 
Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 78, 
/y. Seely denies ihr iileivi , - v pur^ n-.**1 T^. 
SO Seely denies the allegations paragraph 80. 
1 \ I, Seely denies the allegation • i paragraph 81. 
8 2, Seely denies the allegations paragraph 82. 
i ! .- i^'.u::^ and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
K4„ Seely denies the allegations of paragraph 84. 
S > Seely denies the allegations paragraph 85. 
K(> Seely admits that the agreement referenced n\ paragraph M-. -v.tks for itself and 
otherwise denies the allegations of paragraph 86. 
87. Sec:x A-M< l-: =M:-.--M- T-. \ -:Mjjr:i!" ^ 7. 
88. Seely incorporates and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
89. ^Vely denies the allegations paiagraph H(J" 
90 Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 90 and therefore 
91 Seely admits that the statute referenced in paragraph 91 speaks for itself and 
othei wise den ies the allegations of paragraph 91. 
92. Seely incorporates and re-asserts his responses to the foregoing paragraphs. 
93. Seely denies the allegations paragraph 93. 
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94. Seely lacks knowledge regarding the allegations of paragraph 94 and therefore 
denies the same 
95. Seely admits that the statute referenced in paragraph 95 speaks for itself and 
otherwise demes the allegations of paragraph 91. 
96. To the extent any of the paragraphs of the Prayer for Relief seek relief against 
Seely, Seely denies such paragraphs. 
97. Seely denies each and every other allegation of the Counterclaim which has not 
been expressly admitted herein. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The claims against Seely have been filed for an improper purpose, lack a reasonable and 
good faith basis in fact and have otherwise been asserted in bad faith contrary to the provisions 
of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (formerly 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56), and Seely is entitled to recovery of his attorneys fees and costs. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Seely adopts by reference any applicable defense, not otherwise expressly set forth 
herein, that is pleaded by any other party in this action. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 




The claims against Seely are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of laches, waiver 
or laches. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants failed to mitigate their damages, if any, and are therefore barred, in whole or 
in pari fiom Rvnvninti JaniajH^ from Seely 
EIGHTH DEFENSE 
Defendants' injuries 01 damages, if an}' ,, were proximately caused by the acts or omission 
of third parties over whom Seely had no control and no right of control and for whom, Seely is 
not responsible. 
NINTH DEFENSE 
All actions of Seely were reasonable, proper, taken in good faith and in compliance with 
applicable law. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
"I lie claims against Seely are bai red in whole or in pa i t by the lack a nd or failure of 
consideration. 
hLWYKNm DKFKNN* 
If defendants suffered damages as alleged in the Counterclaim, said damages were caused 
sold) by the IU h >.u omissions ui dekmkiiits and/oi their counsel. 
i l 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
The claims against Seely are barred in whole or in part by the lack of privity between 
defendants and Seely. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
The claims against Seely are barred in whole or in part by defendants5 lack of standing. 
FOURTEENTH DEFENSE 
Defendants' claims for damages, if any, are barred in whole or in part because they are 
too remote and speculative. 
FIFTEENTH DEFENSE 
The claims against Seely are barred in whole or in part because Seely does not claim any 
right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
SIXTEENTH DEFENSE 
Seely is a resident of Montana who has not taken any action sufficient to subject himself 
to the jurisdiction of a Utah court. 
SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE 
The claims against Seely are barred because he has no personal liability for the 
obligations or liabilities of or actions taken by the plaintiff, a corporate entity. 
EIGHTEENTH DEFENSE 
Seely reserves the right to assert additional affirmative defenses as discovery continues. 
Wherefore, Seely prays that the Counterclaim and each of its claims against Seely be 
dismissed, that the Court award Seely his attorneys fees and costs incurred in connection with 
12 
this matter, and thji ihc Court, award such fiirther and other relief as may be equitable or 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Dated th is 2 S t % y * >f; ^ pril, 2008. 
RAY QUMNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
Greggcity JTSavage/ 
Michafel W. M^yfield a fi l  
Attorneys jb/Involuntary Plaintiff Clyde G. Seely 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on April Z>2008, a copy of the foregoing 
ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM was served by first class U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dennis C. Farley 
Lear & Lear 
299 South Main, Suite 2200 
Wells Fargo Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
E. Scott Savaige 
Berman & Savage, P.C. 
170 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Clark B. Fetzer 
Bryan H. Booth 
Rinehart Simonsen & Fetzer, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Kim J. Trout 
Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhrman, P.A. 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 




CLARK B. FETZER (USB 1069) 
RINEHART FETZER SIMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
1200 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Phone: (801) 328-0266 ext. 103 
Fax: (801) 328-0269 
KIM J. TROUT (ISB 2468) 
VICKY J. ELKIN(ISB 5978) 
TROUT • JONES • GLEDHILL • FUHRMAN, P.A. 
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820 
P.O. Box 1097 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Phone(208)331-1170 
Facsimile (208) 331-1529 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 




WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, and 
DOES 1-100, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
WITH PREJUDICE 
Civil No. 010500909 
Judge G. Rand Beacham 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
OK-
COMES NOW Defendants Engineered Structures, Inc., Wal-Mart Real Estate Business 
Trust, and American Insurance Company (hereinafter individually identified as "ESI", "Wal-
Mart" and "AIC" and/or collectively identified as "Defendants"), by and through their attorneys 
of record RINEHART FETZER SIMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. and TROUT • JONES • GLEDHILL • 
FUHRMAN, P.A., and state as follows: 
1. ESI, WAL-MART and AIC are parties to litigation in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Washington County in the State of Utah, Civil Case No. 010500909 brought by 
Merrick Young Incorporated ("MYI") as plaintiff against Defendants ("the Litigation"). Upon 
the motion of Defendants SEELY was involuntarily joined as a plaintiff in the Litigation; 
2. In the ruling on SEELY'S Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim 
dated April 8, 2008 in the Litigation, the Court ruled in part: 
The claims made in this case by MYI constitute a chose in action 
which was an asset of MYI. That chose in action was attached by 
Developers in its lawsuit against MYI and its principals, and it was 
transferred to Mr. Seely in accordance with the "Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" signed by Mr. Seely 
in 2004. 
3. The claims made in the Litigation by MYI include (4) causes of action against one 
or more of the Defendants titled: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION, THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION, and FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION. The claims 
described in Paragraphs B and C of these Recitals are collectively referred to as the "Claims." 
4. As of the date of signing this Agreement, SEELY has not transferred or assigned 
the Claims. 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
5. SEELY makes no representations or warranties of any kind that the Court's April 
8, 2008 Ruling is correct or that he in fact acquired, has ever held or now holds any claims 
(including the Claims) against any of ESI, WAL-MART, or AIC. 
6. SEELY and the Defendants wish to settle their disputes and therefore entered into 
a Settlement Agreement attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
Based upon these recitals and pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Defendants move for a dismissal of all claims which have been or may be asserted against them 
and SEELY on the merits, and to entry of an Order in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
SEELY does not oppose this Motion to Dismiss and does not oppose entry of an Order 
consistent with the Settlement Agreement. 
DATED this j£#day of November, 2008. 
RlNEHART FETZER SlMONSEN & BOOTH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
I 
At tpn^s p l a i n t i f f Clyde G. Seely 
MOTION FOR DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE 
EXHIBIT "A" 
EXHIBIT A TO MOTION FOR DISMISSAL AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ("Agreemenf *) is made and entered as of the 
day of October, 2008, by and between Clyde G. Seely ("SEELY") and Defendants Engineered 
Structures, Inc., Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust, and The American Insurance Company 
(hereinafter individually identified as "ESI", "Wal-Mart" and "AIC" and/or collectively 
identified as Defendants"). SEELY, ESI, WAL-MART, and AIC are sometimes referred to 
herein individually as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties". 
RECITALS 
A. ESI, WAL-MART and AIC are parties to litigation in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court in and for Washington County in the State of Utah, Civil Case No. 010500909 brought by 
Merrick Young Incorporated ("MYP) as plaintiff against Defendants ("the Litigation"). Upon 
the motion of Defendants SEELY was involuntarily joined as a plaintiff in the Litigation; 
B. In the ruling on SEELY'S Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim 
dated April 8,2008 in the Litigation, the Court ruled in part: 
The claims made in this case by MYI constitute a chose in action 
which was an asset of MYI. That chose in action was attached by 
Developers in its lawsuit against MYI and its principals, and it was 
transferred to Mr. Seely in accordance with the "Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" signed by Mr. Seely 
in 2004. 
C. The claims made in the Litigation by MYI include (4) causes of action against one 
or more of the Defendants titled: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION, SECOND CAUSE OF 
ACTION, THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION, and FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION. The claims 
described in Paragraphs B and C of these Recitals are collectively referred to as the "Claims/' 
D. As of the date of signing this Agreement, SEELY has not transferred or assigned 
the Claims. 
E. SEELY makes no representations or warranties of any kind that the Court's April 
8, 2008 Ruling is correct or that he in fact acquired, has ever held or now holds any claims 
(including the Claims) against any of ESI, WAL-MART, or AIC. 
F. The Parties wish to settle their disputes pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
this Agreement 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, and 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is unconditionally 
acknowledged, the parties hereto mutually agree as follows: 
1. SEELY, for himself and his predecessors, successors, transferees, and assigns, 
hereby releases, discharges and acquits ESI, WAL-MART, and AIC, and each of them, and each 
of their predecessors, successors, transferees, assigns, parent, affiliates, shareholders, directors, 
officers, employees, agents, attorneys, accountants, and insurers, of and from any and all claims 
(including the Claims), causes of action, debts, liabilities, covenants, contracts, damages, 
demands or obligations of every kind or nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, vested 
or contingent, suspected or unsuspected, which he has ever had, now has, or may have against 
any of ESI, WAL-MART or AIC, whether or not alleged in the Litigation, and which he 
acquired as described in Paragraph No. B. supra. SEELY makes no representations or 
warranties of any kind with respect to whether he acquired, has ever held or now holds any such 
claims (including the Claims). 
2. Each of ESI, WAL-MART, and AIC, for itself and its predecessors, successors, 
transferees, assigns, and affiliates hereby releases, discharges and acquits SEELY and his 
predecessors, successors, transferees, employees, agents, attorneys, accountants, and insurers, of 
and from any and all claims, causes of action, debts, liabilities, covenants, contracts, damages, 
demands or obligations of every kind or nature whatsoever, whether known or unknown, vested 
or contingent, suspected or unsuspected, which each has ever had, now has, or may have against 
Seely, whether or not alleged in the Litigation. 
3. Notfiing in this Agreement (including reference in Paragraph Nos, 1 and 2 to 
SEELY's "predecessors") waives or releases or shall be construed to waive or release any claims 
of Defendants or any of them against MYI, whether or not alleged in the Litigation, which claims 
Defendants expressly reserve. It is the intent of each of the Defendants that SEELY be released 
from any and all claims as provided in Paragraph No. 2. Nothing herein shall be interpreted or 
deemed to create any personal liability on the part of SEELY for any actions or inactions of MYI 
or MYTs predecessors, successors, transferees, assigns, parent, affiliates, shareholders, directors, 
officers, employees, agents, attorneys, accountants, and insurers. 
4. Upon execution of this Agreement, the Defendants may file in the Litigation the 
Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice and the related Order of Dismissal with Prejudice attached 
hereto as Exhibit A and Exhibit B, respectively, SEELY shall indicate his non-opposition to the 
Motion and shall not take any action before the Court to oppose entry of the Order proposed by 
Defendants or any other order consistent with the Settlement Agreement Seely's conduct in this 
regard shall not be deemed to be inconsistent with any position previously asserted by Seely in 
the Litigation. It shall not affect the enforceability of this Agreement if the Court declines to 
sign the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice in the form attached hereto or alters said Order before 
signing it 
5. Each Party shall be responsible for his/its own attorney's fees and costs. No Party 
to this Agreement shall assert a claim for attorneys' fees and costs against the other as related to 
the released claims. 
2 
6. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding concerning the 
subject matter hereof between the Parties and supersedes and replaces all prior negotiations, 
proposed agreements and agreements, written or oral. 
7. This Agreement shall in all respects be inteipreted, enforced and governed by the 
laws of the State of Utah without regard for its conflict of law provisions. 
8. Each of the Parties agrees that this Agreement is the result of a compromise and 
shall never at any time nor for any purpose be considered as an admission of liability or 
responsibility on the part of a Party hereto, 
9. In the event of an action or proceeding regarding this Agreement, the prevailing 
party, in addition to all other legal or equitable remedies possessed, shall be entitled to be 
reimbursed for all expenses and costs, including attorney's fees. 
[Signatures on Following Page] 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed and entered into this Settlement 
Agreement effective as of the date first written above. 
CLYDE G. SEELY 
DATE: fiA)r'S.SLX>% 
DATE f&lfisiag 
DATE: / / / * * f / * f c 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC. 
Its: THOMAS P. HIIL 
President 
WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST 
t v J O j b ^ 
THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY 
DATE: &c,1hberZ 0,200$ By: ffa^MrtAstf,£fat*t 
Its: Sv*. (Pivectory S v 4 # g t y 
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' * / ' ? • 
E. Scott Savage (2865) 
Stephen R. Waldron (6810) 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Fax:(801)531-9926 
Attorneys for Mernck Young Incorporated 
ay„ 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERRICK YOUNG INCORPORATED, a 




WAL-MART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 
TRUST, a Delaware business trust; 
ENGINEERED STRUCTURES, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; THE AMERICAN 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Nebraska 
corporation; WESTERN ROCK 
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Utah 




AND OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
FOR DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Civil No. 010500909 
Honorable G. Rand Beacham 
Plaintiff Merrick Young, Inc. ("MYI") respectfully submits the following objection and 
opposition to defendants' and involuntary plaintiff Clyde G. Seely's ("Seely") Motion for Dismissal 
with Prejudice. 
The Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is objectionable and should be denied as to the 
subject claims for relief asserted against defendants by plaintiff MYI, because (1) the Motion for 
Dismissal with Prejudice depends upon Mr. Seely's settlement agreement with defendants and 
attendant stipulation to the dismissal as the purported real plaintiff-in-interest as to those subject 
claims for relief, and (2) Mr. Seely's stipulation to the dismissal is not effective, either because (a) 
Mr. Seely has no standing to stipulate to the dismissal of the subject claims and defendants may not 
rely upon the stipulation when Mr. Seely fails to acknowledge that he is the real plaintiff-in-interest, 
or (b) it does or should remain to be adjudicated whether Mr. Seely has such standing before any 
such motion can be granted. 
Defendants move to dismiss with prejudice the four claims for relief that MYI asserts 
against defendants, which are the First, Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action in the Amended 
Complaint (the "subject Claims for Relief). Defendants do so (1) on the basis that Mr, Seely 
purportedly is the real plaintiff-in-interest as to the subject Claims for Relief, because those claims 
for relief allegedly were transferred by MYI to Mr. Seely pursuant to a March/April 2004 
"Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, And Assignment" between MYI, Merrick and Stephanie 
Young, Developers Surety and Indemnity Company ("Developers") and Mr. Seely (which resolved 
a separate action against MYI by Developers, who was MYI's bonding company), and (2) based 
upon Mr. Seely's consent, as the purported real plaintiff-in-interest, to the dismissal in an October 
2008 "Settlement Agreement" between Mr. Seely and defendants. 
Notably, Mr. Seely neither claims nor acknowledges that he is the real plaintiff-in-interest 
in the October 2008 "Settlement Agreement," or any other document. Further, defendants do not 
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pay any settlement amount to Mr Seely, or to MYI, under this purported "settlement," by which 
defendants contend that subject Claims for Relief should be dismissed with prejudice. MYI is not 
a party to the October 2008 "Settlement Agreement'* and was not informed of this purported 
"settlement" prior to the filing of the Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice. MYI does not consent 
to the dismissal of the subject Claims for Relief. Instead, MYI seeks an adjudication of the subject 
Claims for Relief on their merits. Defendants have effected a purported "settlement" agreement 
that amounts to a contractual "quit claim deed" that in no manner is dispositive of whether Mr. 
Seely is the real plaintiff-in-interest. That "settlement" is not a proper basis for a dismissal of the 
subject Claims for Relief when MYI remains a proper plaintiff with a claim to sole ownership of the 
Claims for Relief and without a full adjudication of whether Mr. Seely has an interest in the subject 
Claims for Relief. 
The Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice, as to the subject Claims for Relief, depends upon 
Mr. Seely's stipulation to the requested dismissal, as the purported real plaintiff-in-interest as to 
those claims for relief. However, Mr. Seely is only a plaintiff in the action on an involuntary basis, 
upon the motion of defendants, and Mr, Seely already is on record in this action as stating that 
he has no interest in the subject Claims for Relief. 
Mr. Seely was joined as an involuntary plaintiff in this action upon defendants' February 16, 
2007 Utah R. Civ. P. 25(c) motion to have Mr. Seely joined or substituted as a plaintiff in this 
action. In its May 21, 2007 "Corrected Rulings on Pending Motions; Associated Orders," this 
Court ruled on defendants' Rule 25(c) motion by joining, not substituting, Mr. Seely as an 
involuntary plaintiff MYI was not dismissed and, thus, MYI manifestly remained and remains a 
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proper plaintiff. Plainly, Mr. Seely was involuntarily joined as a plaintiff, and MYI remains a 
plaintiff, for the very purpose of deciding in one action both the ownership, and the merits, of the 
subject Claims for Relief. 
On September 28, 2007, Mr. Seely moved to dismiss the Second Amended Counterclaim 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state claims for 
relief against Mr. Seely. Attached to Mr. Seely9 s Motion to Dismiss was a declaration of Mr. Seely 
dated September 26, 2007, in which Mr. Seely disclaimed ownership of the subject Claims for 
Relief, In that declaration, Mr. Seely declared under oath as follows: 
At the time I signed the [March/April 2004 "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, 
and Assignment"], I was generally aware of a dispute between MYI, Wal-Mart and 
others, I did not understand that the [March/April 2004 "Settlement Agreement, 
Mutual Release, and Assignment"] gave me any right or interest with respect to the 
above-captioned litigation [the instant action] nor did I expect to receive any such 
right or interest. The first time I learned that anyone was asserting that I had any 
right or interest with respect to the litigation was when the defendants sought to join 
me as a party in this litigation. I have not at any time, nor do I now, claim any 
right or interest in or with respect to the above-captioned litigation. 
(9/26/07 Declaration of Clyde G. Seely at f 5 (emphasis added).) 
In his reply answer to the Second Amended Counterclaim, Mr. Seely maintained his 
position that he does not have any interest in subject Claims for Relief, On April 25, 2008, Mr. 
Seely filed an "Answer to Second Amended Counterclaim." hi this reply to the Second Amended 
Counterclaim, Mr. Seely denied that; (1) he owns the claims of the Amended Complaint, under the 
March/April 2004 "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" or otherwise, and (2) 
he is the proper plaintiff on those claims. Mr. Seely affinnatively alleged that the claims against 
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him are barred "because Seely does not claim any right or interest in or with respect to the above-
cap tioned litigation." (4/24/08 Answer to Second Amended Counterclaim, at 7-9,12.) 
Although defendants would have the October 2008 "Settlement Agreement" effect the 
dismissal of the subject Claims for Relief as if Mr. Seely was the real plaintiff-in-interest, Mr. Seely 
still does not take the position that he has any interest, much less exclusive interest, in the subject 
Claims for Relief in that purported "settlement" agreement. Mr. Seely purports to stipulate to the 
dismissal of the subj ect Claims for Relief without ever acknowl edging that he has any interest in the 
subject Claims for Relief. 
It is MYI's position that Mr. Seely has no interest in the subject Claims for Relief. The 
March/April 2004 "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" transferred to Mr. 
Seely only eight categories of specified assets belongingto MYI, and two individuals (Merrick and 
Stephanie Young), which were referred to as the "Indemnitors' Assets." If the intent had been to 
transfer all of MYI's and Youngs5 assets, there would have been no need to list eight categories of 
assets. Other assets of MYI and the Youngs not specified in the March/April 2004 "Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment," in addition to the subject Claims for Relief, were 
left with MYI or the Youngs over which Mr. Seely never exercised control. Included in the 
"Indemnitors' Assets" were specifically listed claims to payment from various construction 
projects. The subject Claims for Relief had been asserted in this action and, thus, were known to 
the MYI, the Youngs, Developers and Mr. Seely in March/April 2004 and were a significant asset 
of MYI at -that time. As such, the subject Claims for Relief would have been transferred only by 
specific reference, but they were not specifically listed. The subject Claims for Rehef were 
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accompanied by counterclaim liability, which the March/April 2004 "Settlement Agreement, 
Mutual Release, and Assignment" did not address, but would have (either by a carve-out or an 
indemnity provision) if there had been an intent to transfer the subject Claims for Relief, Two of 
the categories of "Indemnitors' Assets" were (1) "any equity in any other real property, business, or 
asset in which any Indemnitor has an interest," and (2) "any money, stocks, bonds, or other assets 
of any Indemnitor," On its face, the first of these referred to assets in which MYI and/or the two 
individuals considered they had an equity interest, such as real property. This is not how a chose of 
action is referred to. The second of these categories on its face referred only to liquid assets such 
as stocks, bonds and other similar assets, which would not include choses of action such as the 
subject Claims for Relief. 
MYTs principal at the time the March/April 2004 "Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, 
and Assignment" was entered into will provide evidence that there was no intent on MYTs or Mr. 
Seely's part to transfer the subject Claims for Relief to Mr. Seely under that agreement. Both the 
alleged transferor, MYI, and the alleged transferee, Mr. Seely, say and intended that there was no 
transfer. MYI and Mr. Seely always acted consistent with the intent that the subject Claims for 
Relief were not transferred both in an out of this action; they never acted inconsistently with that 
intent and continue in their positions to this day. The only parties in this action claiming there was 
a transfer, defendants, were strangers to the April/March 2004 "Settlement Agreement, Mutual 
Release, and Assignment."" 
MYI recognizes that this Court's April 16, 2008 "Ruling on Clyde G, Seely's Motion to 
Dismiss Second Amended Counterclaim" contained analysis, for purposes of deteimining whether 
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this Court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Seely (an Idaho resident), that the subject Claims for 
Relief were choses in action that were assets of MYI which were transferred to Mr. Seely under 
either of the two categories of "Indemnitors' Assets" in the March/April 2004 "Settlement 
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment" referenced above. Defendants rely upon this 
analysis to pose Mr. Seely as the real plaintiff-m-interest as to the subject Claims for Relief, thereby 
purportedly validating Mr. Seely's stipulation to the dismissal of the subject Claims for Relief. 
However, MYI considers that this analysis was an effort by the Court to exercise judicial 
economy and insure that all parties who might have an interest in the litigation were before the 
Court or, in the alternative, requests the Court to reconsider the need for a full and final 
adjudication of the ownership issue. The Court's analysis was on a motion to dismiss, which by its 
nature- only addressed the matter of personal jurisdiction and Mr. Seely's joinder, rather than the 
merits of any claim. Moreover, the Court's denial of Mr. Seely's motion to dismiss was not 
accompanied by a dismissal of MYI as the plaintiff. MYI remained a plaintiff, indicating that the 
ownership issue remains pending. MYI submits that it still remains to be adjudicated, upon a full 
record, whether the subject Claims for Relief were transferred to Mr, Seely. Indeed, defendant 
ESI's pending Second Amended Counterclaim asserts claims for breach of contract and specific 
performance against only MYI, based upon the same subcontract that is the subject of the subject 
Claims foT Relief, as well as three claims for declaratory relief that raised the issue of ownership of 
the subject Claims for Relief. Mr. Seely replied to this Second Amended Counterclaim denying 
ownership of the subject Claims for Relief. There has not been an adjudication of any of the claims 
asserted in the Second Amended Counterclaim, 
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Fundamentally, Mr. Seely has no standing to stipulate to the dismissal of claims for relief as 
to which he has no interest. Nor is Mr. Seely's stipulation effective when MYI remains a plaintiff 
in the action and, MYI submits, it remains to be adjudicated who is the real plaintiff-in-interest, 
MYI, a valid plaintiff, should not have its claims for relief against defendants dismissed with 
prejudice based upon the stipulation for dismissal by a person who disclaims any interest in those 
claims for relief, who is only a recent plaintiff strictly on an involuntary basis and who was joined 
as a plaintiff for the purpose of adjudicating who is the real plaintiff-in-interest. 
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice is simply the latest tactical maneuver by 
defendants, this time with Mr. Seely's assistance, to prevent an adjudication on the merits of the 
subject Claims for .Relief agamst them. Defendants, who were not parties to the March/April 2004 
"Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release, and Assignment," use that agreement to claim the subject 
Claims for Relief were transferred, when the parties to that agreement firmly are of the position that 
there was no such transfer. Defendants effectively have introduced a "ringer" into this litigation 
who is prepared to dismiss the subject Claims for Relief simply because he does not have any 
interest in those claims and, thus, has no interest in having the claims adjudicated. Without any 
regard to the value of the subject Claims for Relief, Mr, Seely quite rationally is willing to stipulate 
to the dismissal because he stood to recover nothing on the claims, given his avowed and affirmed 
position that he has no interest in the claims. Mr. Seely did so to avoid the cost of having to defend 
defendants' claims against him (which were based upon the claim that he was the transferor of the 
subject Claims for Relief). Defendants have taken advantage of this situation created by them, 
without having to pay any amount to obtain a "settlement" of the claims against them, and thereby 
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avoid an adjudication of those claims. Defendants have done so by using Mr. Seely, a person who 
defendants fought to have joined as an involuntary plaintiff and who continues to disclaim an 
interest in the claims. 
As a consequence, if the Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice were granted, MYI, the only 
plaintiff that has an established interest in the subject Claims for Relief and that has acted 
consistently upon that interest, would be left with nothing after pursuing seven years of litigation 
(several years of which has been consumed by defendants' pursuit of the ownership issue despite 
that both the purported transferor and transferee disclaimed any transfer took place). MYI would 
be denied its right to an adjudication of the subject Claims for Relief on their merits. 
Based upon the foregoing, MYI objects to the Motion to Dismiss as to the subject Claims 
for Relief and respectfully submits that the Motion to Dismiss be denied as to the subject Claims for 
Relief. MYI does not object to or oppose the dismissal of defendants:' claims against Mr. Seely. 
DATED: December 5~, 2008 
BERMAN & SAVAGE, P.C. 
E. Scott Savage 
Stephen R. Waldron 
Attorneys for Merrick Young Incorporated 
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT, WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEVELOPERS SURETY AND 





MERRICK YOUNG INC. also known as 
MERRICK YOUNG CONSTRUCTION;. 
MERRICK YOUNG, individually; 
STEPHANIE YOUNG, individually; 
DOES I through X, inclusive; and ROE 






ORDER FOR PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF 
ATTACHMENT/GARNISHMENT; 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FREEZING ASSETS; and 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, Developers Surety and Indemnity Company f/k/a Developers Insurance 
Company's (post "Developers"), motion for prejudgement writ of attachment/garnishment, 
motion for ex parte temporary restraining and asset freeze order and preliminary injunction, 
having come on for a hearing on the 20th day of February, 2003; Kurt C. Faux, Esq., appearing on 
behalf of Plaintiff Developers Insurance Company; and no appearance onbehalf of Defendants 
Merrick Young, individually; Stephanie Young, individually, and Merrick Young, Inc. a.k.a. 
Merrick Young Construction (Defendants are collectively referred to as "Indemnitors"); and the 
Court having "reviewed .the pleadings and papers on file herein and having entertained the 
argument of counsel makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. and Order as 
follows: 
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THE COURT FINDS THE FOLLOWING FACTS: 
1. Developers issued Labor and Material Payment Bond and Performance Bond No. 
870694P (hereinafter referred to as the "Black Ridge Bond"), with City of St. George, as 
obligee, and Young, as principal, for the project known as Black Ridge Drive, 250 West 
Improvement, Project SID 99-4, Inquiry No. 00-1260. Exhibit Al1. The amount, or penal sum, 
of the bond is $1,543,000.00. Id. 
2. Developers also issued Payment Bond and Performance Bond No. 870960P 
(hereinafter referred to as the "River Road Bond"), with the County of Washington, as obligee, 
and Young, as principal, for the project known as River Road, Project No. STP-3196(1)0. 
Exhibit A2. The penal sum of the bond is $1,229,229.00. Id. 
3. As part of the consideration for issuing the Bonds2, the Indemnitors executed an 
mdemnity Agreement. Exhibit A3. The Indemnitors promised in the Indemnity Agreement to 
indemnify and hold harmless Developers from all losses arising out of the issuance of the Bonds: 
1. INDEMNIFICATION. In consideration of the execution and 
delivery by Surety of a Bond or any Bonds on behalf of Principal, 
Principal and Indemnitor shall pay all premiums charged by Surety 
hi connection with any Bond (including extensions, renewals or 
modifications) issued by Surety on behalf of Principal and shall 
indemnify and hold harmless Surety from and against any and all 
liability, loss, claims, demand, costs, damages, attorney's fees and 
expenses of whatever kind or nature, together with interest thereon 
at the maximum rate allowed by law, which Surety may sustain or 
incur by reason of or in consequence of the execution and delivery 
by Surety of any Bond on behalf of Principal, whether or not Surety 
shall have paid any amount on account thereof, including,... (Emphasis 
added). Id 
4. The Indemnity Agreement also obligated the Indemnitors to post collateral with 
Developers in a sum equal to a reserve established by Developers to cover any claim, suit, or 
judgment against the Bonds. Specifically, the Indemnity Agreement provides as follows: 
3. RESERVE ACCOUNT. If Surety shall establish a reserve 
account to cover any liability, claim asserted, suit or judgment 
1
 All exhibits refer to Developers' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of A.ttachment et al., file on 
December 6, 2002. 
2
 The Black Ridge Bond and River Road Bond are referred to collectively as the "Bonds." 
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under any Bond, the Indemnitor shall, immediately upon demand 
and whether or not Surety shall have made any payment therefor, 
deposit with Surety a sum of money equal to such reserve account 
and any increase thereof as collateral security on such Bond, and 
such sum and other money and property which shall have been or 
shall thereafter be pledged as collateral security on any such Bond 
shall be available, in the discretion of Surety, as collateral security 
on all Bonds coming within the scope of this Agreement or for any 
other indebtedness of Indemnitor or Principal to Surety.... (Emphasis 
added). Id 
5. The Indemnitors promised to and granted Developers broad 
discretionary powers and authority to resolve claims, and promised that Developers' itemized 
statement of claims or losses constitutes prima facie evidence of the fact and extent of the 
Indemnitors' liability: 
2. EXERCISE OF RIGHTS BY SURETY. In connection with the 
Exercise of any of Surety's rights under this Agreement: 
2.1 Surety shall have the right in its sole and absolute discretion 
to determine whether any claims under a Bond shall be paid, 
Compromised, defended, prosecuted or appealed. 
2.2 Surety shall have the right to incur such expenses in handling 
a claim as it shall deem necessary, including but not limited to, 
expenses for investigative, accounting, engineering and legal services. 
* * * 
2.4 In any claim or suit hereunder, an itemized statement of claims or 
losses paid or liabilities incurred and expenses paid or incurred, 
declared under penalty of perjury to be true and correct by an officer 
of Surety, or the vouchers or other evidence of disbursement by 
Surety, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact and extent of liability 
hereunder of Principal and Indemnitor. (Emphasis added). Exhibit A3. 
6. Indemnitors consented in the Indemnity Agreement to the assignment of 
Indemnitors' assets, appointment of a receiver without notice, waiver of the right to claim 
property, and the endowment to Developers of Indemnitors' power of attorney to enforce these 
rights. Exhibit A3, paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
7. Developers received numerous claims against the Bonds from suppliers and 
subcontractors of Merrick Young, Inc. Exhibit A4. Developers made many attempts to 
convince the Indemnitors to directly satisfy any obligations to the bond claimants and to satisfy 
the Indemnitors' obligations to Developers under the Indemnity Agreement. These attempts 
included numerous telephone calls, letters, and personal meetings. Exhibit A, para. 8. The 
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Indemnitors have been materially unresponsive to Developers' requests and demands. Id. 
8. Given the number of claims, Developers demanded, in accordance with the terms 
of the Indemnity Agreement, that the Indemnitors deposit collateral security with Developers in 
the sum of $540,668.61, which was consistent with the reserves of Developers in response to the 
numerous claims. Exhibit A4 at 2. The demanded collateral has not been received. Exhibit A, 
paragraph 9. 
9. The Indemnitors have been materially unresponsive to Developers and failed to 
resolve the claims against the Bonds despite having the opportunity to do so. Thus, Developers 
has resolved numerous claims against the Bonds - at considerable expense, as follows: 
CLAIMANTS PAID: (Black Ridge Bond) 
KV Electric 
Triple "B" Concrete and Western Rock Products 
Environmental Abatement, Inc. 
TOTAL PAID TO DATE ON BLACK RIDGE BOND 
CLAIMANTS PAID: (River Road Bond) 
Koch Performance Asphalt 
KV Electric 
Progressive Contracting 
Progressive Contracting & AT Asphalt Paving 
Contech Construction 
Hikiau, Inc. 
TOTAL PAID TO DATE ON RIVER ROAD BOND 














*n T * *T* f^* 
* * * * 
* * * * 
<? °* £* :> t^ r-Q vo *n 
g < « *> 
fcz.SS 
O to r- «-
w < ~rr 
W id < 






























10. Outstanding claims not yet resolved are as follows: 
CLAIMANTS: (Black Ridge Bond) 
Familian Northwest 
Bulloch Brothers 
CLAIMANT: (River Road Bond) 
K&J Traffic Control (Lawsuit pending) 






11. Developers has incurred a loss thus far of $436,812.48 in satisfying the 
Indemnitors' obligations to the numerous claimants pursuant to the terms of the Bonds. Exhibit 
A, para. 12. The potential for further loss to Developers exists. Id. 
12. Substantiated evidence has been presented that the individual Indemnitors either 
have moved or are moving from the State of Utah to the State of Montana and are terminating 
and winding-up Merrick Young, Inc., as a business entity. Exhibit A, para. 14; Exhibit B. 
13. Indemnitors (either all or individually) have been sued in excess of 20 occasions 
for the alleged failure to pay their obligations. Exhibit C. 
14. . Developers is justified in its fear that Indemnitors may dissipate assets absent 
prejudgment relief and protection. 
THE COURT ENTERS THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. There is a substantial likelihood that Developers will prevail on the merits of 
Developers' underlying claim that the Indemnity Agreement constitutes a valid and binding 
contract between Developers and mdemnitors. 
2. Developers has presented a preponderance of material, substantive evidence to 
show entitlement to a preliminary injunction and that there is a substantial likelihood that 
Developers will prevail on the merits of Developers' underlying claims that: 
3
 Exhibit 5. 
4
 Exhibit 6. 
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a. Indemnitors breached the Indemnity Agreement with Developers by failing to 
post collateral security in the amount of $540,668.61 as required by paragraph 3 of the Indemnity 
Agreement; 
b. Indemnitors breached the Indemnity Agreement with Developers by failing to 
hold harmless, defend and indemnify Developers from any cost, expense, or attorneys5 fees as 
required by paragraph 1 of the Indemnification Agreement. Exhibit A3. 
c. Developers has demonstrated equitable entitlement to payment 
of$540,668.61. 
d. Developers is entitled to specific performance to enforce the Indemnitors' 
obligation to post collateral security as set forth in the Indemnity Agreement. 
e. Developers has satisfied the standards for the issuance of a preliminary injunction 
as set forth in URCP 65 A(e) by showing that: 
(1) Developers will suffer irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
(2) The threatened injury to Developers outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the Indemnitors; 
(3) The order or injunction will not be adverse to the public 
interest; and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that Developers will prevail on the 
merits of the underlying claims. 
f. Developers has met the requirements for the issuance of a Pre-judgment Writ of 
Attachment pursuant to URCP 64C and Pre-judgment Writ of Garnishment pursuant to UUCP 
64D by a preponderance of the evidence and by showing, pursuant to URCP 64C(a), that: (1) 
the Indemnitors are indebted to Developers in the amount of $540,668.61 over and above any 
legal setoff; (2) the nature of the Indemnitors5 indebtedness; (3) the attachment/garnishment is 
not sought to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the Indemnitors; (4) the payment of the debt 
was not secured by any mortgage or hen or that such security has become impaired without any 
act of Developers. 
g. Developers has further met the requirements for the issuance of a Writ of 
Attachment and Garnishment based on URCP 64C(a) by showing by a preponderance of the 
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1 H evidence that (1) the hidenmitois have departed at are about to depart from the State of Utah to 
2 || the injury of Developers; (2) the Indemnitors, Menick and Stephanie Young, are no longer 
residents of the State of Utah and Indemnitor Merrick Young, Inc., is winding-up its affairs; and 
4 || (3) the existence of additional facts as set forth above showing that Developers has probable 
5 || cause for being justly apprehensive of losing its claims unless the writs of attachment and 
. 6 II garnishment are issued. 
7 3. Pursuant to URCP 65A(a)(l), proper notice of the proceedings was provided to 
8 the Indemnitors. 
9 NOW THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
10 OF LAW AND GOOD CAUSE SHOWING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
11 AND DECREED as lollops: 
12 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Developers be issued 
13 Pre-judgment Writs of Execution, Attachment and Garnishment in the amount of $540,668.61 
14 representing the reserves of Developers and/or payments made by Developers in response to 
15 claims against the Bonds. 
16 IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to 
17 URCP 64C and URCP 64D, Developers may execute, attach and garnish, in the amount of 
18 $540,668.61, the accounts receivable, assets, interests, money, stocks, memberships, bonds, real 
19 property, and personal property in which the Indemnitors have an interest, including but not 
20 limited to, the following: 
21 1. Merrick Young 
Stephanie Young 
22 3511 Paiute Road 
St. George or Bloomington, Utah 84790-7741 
2 3 
The above real property known as 3511 Paiute Road and any funds obtained from 
24 . its sale, including all other assets of the Indemnitors. 
25 2. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or collectively, for the 
project known as Black Ridge Drive, 250 West Improvement, Project SID 99-4, 
26 Inquiry No. 00-1260. 
27 3. Funds du'e and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or collectively, for the 
project known as River Road, Project No. STP-3196(1)0. 
28 
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4. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or collectively, from 
General Contractor, La Farge, N.A., for the project known as 1-15 Sevier River 
Northward Project, Project No.: *M-NH-15-5(31)200. 
5. Funds due and owing to Indemnitors, either individually or collectively, from 
General Contractor, Meadow Valley Contractors, Lie , for the project known as 
UDOT 1-15 North Interchange, 
Project No.: M-15-2-3861. 
6. Any equity in any other real property, business or asset in which any Indemnitor 
has an interest. 
7. Any money, stocks, bonds, or other assets of any Indemnitor. 
8. Any interest in Black Ridge Commercial Center, LLC; Black Ridge, LLC, or any 
other partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, sole 
proprietorship, corporation, or other business entity in which any Indemnitor has 
an interest, and any real property in which these entities have an interest. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Indemnitors Merrick Young, individually; Stephanie Young, individually; and 
Merrick Young Inc. (collectively referred to as "Indemnitors") are preliminarily enjoined as 
follows: 
1. Indemnitors are enjoined, restrained and prevented from selling, transferring, 
disposing, distributing, pledging, or encumbering any corporate assets, limited liability company 
assets, partnership assets, real property, personal property or assets of any business entity in 
which Indemnitors possess an interest until farther order of this Court except as described in 
paragraph 3 below. 
2. All corporations, limited liability companies, partnerships and/or any 
business entities in which Indemnitors possess any interest are hereby restrained, enjoined and 
prevented from selling, transferring, disposing, distributing, pledging, or encumbering any asset 
or real or personal property until further order of this Court. 
3. Merrick Young, individually; and Stephanie Young, individually; shall be allotted 
reasonable funds for reasonable daily living expenses, such as food, housing, gasoline for 
necessary travel, clothing, and utilities for the household, but are enjoined, absent approval of 
this Court, from the purchase or expenditure of funds to acquire any motorized vehicle, jewelry, 
stocks, bonds, vacations or other consumer items not necessary to sustain life and health. 
4. This Order is binding upon the parties to this action, their officers, agents, 
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with 
them who receive notice, in person or through counsel, or otherwise, of this Order. 
5. Based on the above facts and law, and pursuant to URCP 64F and URCP 
65A(c)(l), no security, undertaking or bond is required of Developers. 
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